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[Abstract: Ten years ago, the conventional wisdom among international law academics
was that customary international law (CIL) had the status of self-executing federal
common law to be applied by courts without any need for political branch authorization.
This “modern position” came under attack by so-called “revisionist” critics who argued
that CIL had the status of federal common law only in the relatively rare situations in
which the Constitution or political branches authorized courts to treat it as such. Modern
position proponents are now claiming that the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain confirms that CIL has the status of self-executing federal common law.
As this Article explains, the decision in Sosa did not in fact embrace the modern position,
and, indeed, is best read as rejecting it. Commentators who construe Sosa as embracing
the modern position have confounded the automatic incorporation of CIL as domestic
federal law in the absence of political branch authorization (i.e., the modern position)
with the entirely different issue of whether and to what extent a particular statute, the
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), authorizes courts to apply CIL as domestic federal law. The
Article also explains how CIL continues to be relevant to domestic federal common law
despite Sosa’s rejection of the modern position. The fundamental flaw of the modern
position is that it ignores the justifications for, and limitations on, post-Erie federal
common law. As the Article shows, however, there are a number of contexts in addition
to the ATS in which it is appropriate for courts to develop federal common law by
reference to CIL, including certain jurisdictional contexts not amenable to state regulation
(namely admiralty and interstate disputes), and gap-filling and interpretation of foreign
affairs statutes and treaties. The Article concludes by considering several areas of likely
debate during the next decade concerning the domestic status of CIL: corporate aiding
and abetting liability under the ATS; application of CIL to the war on terrorism; and the
use of foreign and international materials in constitutional interpretation.]
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I.

Introduction

The most contested issue in U.S. foreign relations law during the last decade has
been the domestic status of customary international law (“CIL”).1 At the outset of this
period, the conventional wisdom among international law academics was that CIL had
the status of self-executing federal common law to be “applied by courts in the United
States without any need for it to be enacted or implemented by Congress.”2 This
“modern position” came under attack by so-called “revisionist” critics who argued that
CIL had the status of federal common law only in the relatively rare situations in which
the Constitution or political branches authorized courts to treat it as such.3
A number of modern position proponents have argued that the Supreme Court’s
2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain4 resolves this debate in their favor. Dean
Harold Koh, for example, contends that “all of the . . . circuits have [embraced the
modern position] (and now the U.S. Supreme Court has as well, in the Alvarez-Machain
case).”5 Professor Ralph Steinhardt claims that CIL “was and [after Sosa] remains an
area in which no affirmative legislative act is required to ‘authorize’ its application in
U.S. courts.”6 Professor Beth Stephens similarly maintains that Sosa “recognized that
post-Erie federal common law includes those aspects of the old general common law that
are peculiarly within the power of the federal government, and that international law was
and remains within that area of federal control.”7
1

CIL, historically referred to as part of the “law of nations,” is the law of the international
community that “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation.” Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement (Third)]; see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(b) (stating
that international custom is a source of law that can be applied by the International Court of Justice “as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”).
2

Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561
(1984); see also Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 111 cmt. d, § 115 cmt. e; Lea Brilmayer, Federalism,
State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295, 304, 332 n.
109; Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1846-47
(1998); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992).
3

See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); A. M. Weisburd, State Courts,
Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); see also Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 665 (1986).
4

542 U.S. 692 (2004).

5

Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 12 (2004).
6

Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the
Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2254-61 (2004).
7

Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation
in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533, 548 (2004). See also, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and
Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004) (contending that Sosa’s
“import is to confirm that international custom was part of judicially enforceable federal law even in the
absence of a statute”); Leila Nadya Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of
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Both the pre- and post-Sosa debates largely turn on the implications of the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Erie v. Tompkins.8 Modern position proponents
either have dismissed Erie as irrelevant to the domestic status of CIL, or have suggested
that Erie elevated CIL from general common law to a more robust federal common law.9
Revisionists, by contrast, have insisted on the relevance of Erie for the domestic status of
CIL, while denying that Erie leads to a more robust common law of CIL.
The debate over Erie’s relevance to the domestic status CIL has significant
practical implications. If the emerging post-Sosa conventional wisdom is correct, CIL
would provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction, and it would authorize courts to
use CIL to preempt inconsistent state law, and possibly even to override Executive
Branch action and some federal legislation.10 These consequences would dramatically
expand the international human rights litigation permitted under the Sosa decision, and
(International) Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329, 342 (2005) (“The six-justice
majority in Sosa rejected the revisionist view.”); John M. Van Dyke, The Role of Customary International
Law in Federal and State Court Litigation, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 361, 374 (2004) (“This view has been
rejected by numerous recent decisions, but it has continued to be put forward by its revisionist proponents
with a spirited enthusiasm. With the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, this
revisionist position should finally be given its ultimate burial.”); Recent Case, Igartúa de la Rosa v. Puerto
Rico, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1622, 1627 (2006) (“In Sosa, the Court clearly rejected this revisionist argument,
adopting the language of the predominant view.”); Leading Cases: Federal Statutes and Regulations, 118
HARV. L. REV. 446, 453 (2004) (“Much of the majority’s analysis is consistent with the view that . . . all
customary international law has been included within federal common law.”); cf. William S. Dodge,
Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 96-97 (2004) (arguing that Sosa endorses a particularized rather than
wholesale incorporation of CIL into federal common law); Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of
Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 132 (arguing that Sosa allows courts to “recogniz[e]
and incorporat[e] international norms, to the extent they can be harmonized with other federal law”).
8

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

9

See, e.g., Koh, supra note 2, at 1831 (“Curiously, [revisionists] read Erie as effecting a near
complete ouster of federal courts from their traditional role in construing customary international law
norms.”); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 380 (1997) (“[T]he Erie decision did not
require that federal courts stop citing cases decided before 1938 and reinvent federal common law from
scratch.”); Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United
States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 308 (1999) (criticizing revisionists for their “nearly obsessive focus on
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, and Swift v. Tyson”); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary
International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 397 (1997) (“[W]hile Erie
rejected the general common law, it upheld the federal courts’ power to develop common law in areas
properly governed by federal law, including international law.”).
10

For the claim that CIL creates federal jurisdiction and preempts state law, see, for example,
Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 111(1); Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 303. For the view that it binds the
Executive Branch, see Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 324-25 (1985); Jules Lobel,
The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1071, 1116-20 (1985); Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 115 reporters’ note 4. For the view that it
might trump inconsistent prior federal law, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987); see
also Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 115 reporters’ note 4.
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would provide a vehicle by which U.S. citizens could challenge the actions of their
government (state and federal) based on evolving CIL. These consequences might have
particularly significant implications for challenges to Executive action in the war on
terrorism.
In this Article, we hope to make three contributions to the debate about CIL’s
domestic status after Sosa. First, we will attempt to focus the debate more directly on
Erie and its implications for modern federal common law. Like the Court in Sosa (but
unlike many proponents of the modern position), we believe that Erie is centrally relevant
to the modern status of CIL in U.S. courts. Any theory of the domestication of CIL as
federal common law must be consistent with Erie’s basic premises, and in this Article we
attempt to flesh out the implications of those premises for a domesticated CIL.
Second, we will critique the emerging claim that Sosa constitutes an endorsement
of the modern position view that CIL is incorporated wholesale into the U.S. legal system
as federal common law. As we will show, the decision in Sosa clearly did not embrace
the modern position, and, indeed, is best read as rejecting it. Commentators who construe
Sosa as embracing the modern position have confounded the automatic incorporation of
CIL as domestic federal law in the absence of congressional authorization (i.e., the
modern position) with the entirely different issue of whether and to what extent a
particular statute, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), authorizes courts to apply CIL as
domestic federal law. The ATS, which was first enacted in 1789, grants federal district
courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”11 The Court in Sosa held
that the ATS authorized federal courts to recognize federal common law causes of action
for a narrow class of CIL violations. The Court based this conclusion on what was in
effect a translation of the specific intentions of the ATS framers to the regime of postErie federal common law. As we will explain, the Court’s analysis would be superfluous
if it agreed with the modern position. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning and conclusions
on a number of points simply cannot be reconciled with the modern position.
Third, we will explain how CIL continues to be relevant to domestic federal
common law despite Sosa’s rejection of the modern position. The fundamental flaw of
the modern position is that it ignores the justifications for, and limitations on, post-Erie
federal common law. As we will show, however, there are a number of contexts in
addition to the ATS in which it is appropriate for courts to develop federal common law
by reference to CIL, including certain jurisdictional contexts not amenable to state
regulation (namely admiralty and interstate disputes), and gap-filling and interpretation of
foreign affairs statutes and treaties. In short, rejection of the modern position does not
entail a rejection of the judicial domestication of CIL, but at the same time CIL can be
domesticated by the courts only in accordance with the requirements and limitations of
post-Erie federal common law – limitations that, as we explain, were reaffirmed by the
Court in Sosa.

11

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the basic principles of Erie and
its implications for modern federal common law. Part III distinguishes and describes the
various pre-Sosa debates concerning the domestic status of CIL, and shows how Erie is
central to each of these debates. Part IV analyzes the Sosa decision, explains its
implications for the pre-Sosa debates, and shows how it is best read as rejecting the
modern position. Part V considers some of the many ways that CIL can, consistent with
Erie, inform the development of federal common law in the U.S. legal system even after
rejection of the modern position. It also discusses several areas of likely debate during
the next decade concerning the domestic status of CIL.

II.

Erie and Modern Federal Common Law

In this Part, we briefly describe the general common law framework that existed
prior to Erie, the Court’s justifications in Erie for rejecting that framework, and the
contours of the post-Erie federal common law. We do not attempt here to offer new
insights about these widely-discussed subjects; our goal is merely to remind readers of
certain settled propositions that are relevant to debates over the domestic status of CIL.
A.

General Common Law

Before Erie, federal and state courts in civil cases applied a body of law that came
to be known as “general common law.”12 They “resorted to [general common law] to
provide the rules of decision in particular cases without insisting that the law be attached
to any particular sovereign.”13 As Justice Holmes would eventually describe and criticize
it, general common law was “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”14
Courts did not view general common law as having the status of federal law.
They did not consider it part of the “Laws of the United States” within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause, and claims arising under it did not fall within either Article III or
statutory federal question jurisdiction.15 Federal court interpretations of general common
12

See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1279-85 (1996); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1798: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984); Stewart Jay,
Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985). Early in U.S. history, federal
courts also applied a common law of crimes, but the Supreme Court disallowed this practice in the early
1800s. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); United States v. Coolidge,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
13

Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1517.

14

Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes argued elsewhere that, instead of this “brooding
omnipresence in the sky,” the common law should in fact be understood as “the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15

See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1521-25.
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law were not binding on state courts, and federal and state courts sometimes adopted
differing interpretations of this law.16
A famous early example of the application of general common law occurred in
Swift v. Tyson, 17 in which the Supreme Court applied “principles established in the
general commercial law,” rather than New York state court decisions, to resolve a
commercial dispute concerning the validity of an assignment of a negotiable instrument,
even though the assignment had occurred in New York. In support of its decision, the
Court reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act, which requires federal courts to apply the
“laws of the several states” in cases not governed by the Constitution, treaties, or federal
statutes, applies only to “the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent
locality,” and not to state court decisions on “questions of a more general nature.”18
Although relatively uncontroversial for much of the nineteenth century, the
general common law regime became controversial in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as courts began to apply it to a broader array of cases. One of many
criticisms of this regime was that it allowed litigants to forum shop between federal and
state courts for the most favorable interpretation of the general common law. A notorious
example of this forum shopping occurred in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab Co.19 There, a Kentucky taxicab company reincorporated in Tennessee
so that it could enter into an exclusive contract with a railroad and then sue another
Kentucky taxicab company under diversity jurisdiction for interference with the contract,
and thereby obtain a federal court ruling concerning the validity of its contract. The
Supreme Court upheld the existence of diversity jurisdiction and proceeded to affirm
judgment for the plaintiff, even though Kentucky courts would have found the exclusive
railroad contract to be invalid.
The Court in Black & White Taxicab explained its divergence from the state
decisions as follows: “For the discovery of common law principles applicable in any
case, investigation is not limited to the decisions of the courts of the State in which the
controversy arises. State and federal courts go to the same sources for evidence of the
existing applicable rule. The effort of both is to ascertain that rule.”20 Justice Holmes,
along with two other Justices, dissented. He argued that the general common law regime
rested on the “fallacy” that law can exist without some definite authority behind it. Once
it is recognized that state court application of general common law receives its authority
from the state and thus is in effect state law, he reasoned, the practice of federal courts
declining to follow that law in diversity cases should be seen as “an unconstitutional

16

Restatement (Third), supra note 1, pt. 1, ch. 2, introductory note at 41.

17

See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

18

Id. at 18.

19

275 U.S. 518, 529 (1928).

20

Id. at 529.
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assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States.”21
B.

Erie v. Tompkins

The specific issue in Erie was what law should be applied by a federal court,
sitting in diversity, to determine the tort duties that a railroad owed to someone walking
along the railroad’s tracks. In holding that the common law of the state where the federal
court sat should apply, the Court expressly overruled Swift v. Tyson and held that,
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”22 This is true, the Court explained, even
when state law is reflected in judicial decisions. The Court made clear that, henceforth,
“[t]here is no federal general common law.”23
The Court gave both functional and constitutional justifications for its decision to
overturn Swift. First, it noted that the general common law regime allowed by Swift had
led to undesirable results. Among other things, the Court expressed concern about the
unfairness of allowing out-of-state plaintiffs to choose whether a case would be heard in
state or federal court, based on which court had a more favorable view of the general
common law.24
Second, and more significantly, the Court described the general common law
regime as being “unconstitutional.” Quoting extensively from Justice Holmes’ reasoning
in Black & White Taxicab, the Court explained that when federal judges decline to follow
state common law decisions they are in effect making law. Such law-making, the Court
suggested, raised both federalism and separation of powers concerns. In terms of
federalism, the Court noted that the disregard of state court decisions on commercial and
tort law questions “invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the
several States.”25
The Court also linked its federalism analysis to considerations of separation of
powers. The Court noted that even “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts,” and that “no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”26 The Court’s observation
about limited congressional power would become less significant as views about
congressional power expanded in subsequent years. But the observation about a lack of
general legislative power in the judiciary continued to apply. As Professor Merrill has
noted, “the federalism principle identified by Erie still exists but has been silently
21

Id. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

22

304 U.S. at 78.

23

Id.

24

See id. at 74-75.

25

Id. at 80.

26

Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
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transformed from a general constraint on the powers of the federal government into an
attenuated constraint that applies principally to one branch of that government – the
federal judiciary.”27
C.

Post-Erie Federal Common Law

Although there are statements in Erie suggesting that the only common law that
federal courts can apply is the common law of the states, Erie in fact gave birth to the
development of a new common law in the federal courts.28 This “federal common law” is
genuine federal law that binds the states under the Supremacy Clause and that potentially
establishes “arising under” jurisdiction under Article III and the federal question
jurisdiction statute.29
The Supreme Court has never provided a comprehensive explanation of its
approach to federal common law after Erie, and it has sometimes simply referred to the
fact that there are “enclaves” of federal common law on issues of national importance.30
Nonetheless, certain basic parameters of post-Erie federal common law can be discerned
from Erie itself and the various post-Erie federal common law decisions: it derives its
authority from extant federal law; it is interstitial; and it must be tailored to the policy
choices reflected in its federal law sources.
First, because “the federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the
judicial, branch of government,”31 federal common law must be grounded in extant
federal law: the Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty. It is this grounding in a
federal law source that allows federal common law to have the status of preemptive law
under the Supremacy Clause. Recall that Erie insisted that all law applied by federal
courts must derive from a domestic sovereign source, and thus must be either federal law
27

Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14-16
(1985); see also George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10
CONST. COMMENTARY 285, 288 (1993) (same); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966) (“It is by no means clear enough [to justify federal common lawmaking] that . . . Congress could
under the Constitution readily enact a complete code of law governing [the subject matter of the case].
Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for
Congress.”).
28

See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie – And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 405-07 (1964).
29

See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (“§ 1331 jurisdiction will support
claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”); see also Merrill, supra
note 27, at 6-7 (distinguishing federal common law from general common law). Federal common law is
often still “general” in the sense that its content is derived from general principles or practice. See Caleb
Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006). But it is not general in the
sense of applying across entire fields of law, and it has federal law status, rather than general law status, in
U.S. courts. Even the modern federal common law of admiralty is applied an interstitial way. See infra __.
30

See, e.g., Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (recounting areas in
which the Court has approved of federal common law); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (noting that “there are enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the States”).
31

Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
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or state law.32 Erie’s holding – that state law governed in diversity cases – followed from
these premises because there was no basis in the Constitution or any federal statute for
federal courts to develop their own law in such cases. From these same premises
emerged the basic animating principle of post-Erie federal common law: when the
common law being developed by federal courts did have some federal law basis, then it
had the status of truly federal law.
The Supreme Court has not always explicitly articulated this requirement of a
federal law source. Nevertheless, the reasoning in even its most expansive federal
common law decisions typically reflects this requirement. In Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,33 for example, the Court held that the rights and duties of the United States
government concerning federal checks must be governed by federal common law. The
Court reasoned that, because the government’s issuance of the check in question
stemmed from its constitutional powers and was for services performed under a federal
statute, the federal common law rights and duties associated with the check “find their
roots in the same federal sources.”34 To take another example, in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino the Court held that the act of state doctrine, pursuant to which courts
will assume the validity of foreign government acts taken within their territory, is a rule
of federal common law binding on the states.35 The Court grounded its decision in two
federal law sources: “constitutional underpinnings” relating to the separation of powers in
conducting U.S. foreign relations, which the Court held “must be treated exclusively as
an aspect of federal law,” and numerous federal constitutional and statutory provisions
suggesting that sensitive foreign relations questions were exclusive federal concerns.36
While there is much scholarly debate about the proper contours of federal
common law, there is widespread agreement that federal common law must be grounded
in a federal law source. For example, Professor Merrill has advocated a restrictive
approach to federal common law, whereby there would have to be a showing that the
federal common law rule “can be derived from the specific intentions of the draftsmen of
an authoritative federal text.”37 By contrast, Professor Field has argued for a broader
approach, maintaining that the development of federal common law is appropriate so
long as the court can “point to a federal enactment, constitutional or statutory, that it
interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule.”38 The key point for present
32

See supra __.

33

318 U.S. 363 (1943).

34

Id. at 366.

35

376 U.S. 398, 424-27 (1964).

36

See id. at 425-26 & n. 25.

37

Merrill, supra note 27, at 47.

38

Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883,
887 (1986). For a similarly broad view, see Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts,
12 PACE L. REV. 263, 288 (1992) (arguing that “federal judges must wait for Congress to take the first
step,” but “[o]nce Congress has acted . . . federal courts can make any common law ‘necessary and proper’
to implement the statute”).
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purposes is that despite disagreement over how it is to be applied, there is general
agreement on the requirement of a federal law source. Even Henry Friendly, a
particularly enthusiastic supporter of federal common law, tied federal common law to
congressional intent.39
Second, because “[f]ederal courts, unlike state courts, are not general commonlaw courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of
decision,”40 the post-Erie federal common law is interstitial. It is applied in a retail
fashion to fill in the gaps, or interstices, of federal statutory or constitutional regimes. As
Justice Holmes noted in a pre-Erie decision, “judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”41
Third, when developing federal common law, courts must act consistently with
the policy choices reflected in extant federal law. As Justice Jackson explained, “federal
common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them.”42 This proposition follows from the fact that federal common law is a derivative
form of lawmaking rather than an independent judicial power to make policy decisions.
Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has long stated that the
instances in which it is appropriate to develop federal common law are “few and
restricted.”43 In the last fifteen years or so in particular, the Court has been emphatic
about the exceptional nature of federal common law.44 The Court has also adopted a
restrictive approach in recent years to the judicial recognition of private rights of action
under federal statutes and the Constitution, which can be seen as a remedial form of
federal common law.45

39

See Friendly, supra note 28, at 407 (“Just as federal courts now conform to state decisions on
issues properly for the states, state courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where Congress,
acting within powers granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so slightly, an intention to that end.”)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 422 (noting that “state courts must follow federal decisions on subjects
within national legislative power where Congress has so directed”) (emphasis added).
40

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981); see also, e.g., United States v. Standard
Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
41

Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

42

D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966) (“If there is a federal statute dealing with
the general subject, it is a prime repository of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law.”).
43

Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).

44

See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S.
79 (1994). As we explain below, Sosa continues this trend.
45

See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2001); Correctional Services Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66-80 (2001).
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III.

Pre-Sosa Debates Regarding the Domestic Status of CIL

The Sosa case concerned actions taken by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA). In 1990, the DEA recruited Sosa and other Mexican nationals to abduct, in
Mexico, Alvarez-Machain, another Mexican national, and transport him to the United
States to stand trial for his alleged involvement in the torture of a DEA agent in Mexico.
After he was acquitted, Alvarez-Machain sued Sosa under the ATS, alleging that he had
violated a CIL prohibition on arbitrary arrest.46 Sosa, and the U.S. government acting as
amicus curiae, argued that the ATS was simply a jurisdictional statute that did not create
a cause of action for violations of CIL. Alvarez-Machain, by contrast, argued that the
ATS did create CIL causes of action, including a cause of action for arbitrary arrest.
The legal controversy in Sosa arose against the background of debates, in the
courts and the academy, about four distinct issues concerning CIL’s status in the
domestic legal system. Since many commentators interpreting Sosa have confused the
decision’s resolution of one of these issues with its resolution of others, it is important to
distinguish the issues carefully and to understand their relationship to one another. The
first debate concerns the historical status of CIL in the U.S. legal system prior to Erie v.
Tompkins during the era of “general common law.” The second debate concerns CIL’s
domestic legal status, following Erie, in the absence of some authorization by the
political branches to apply CIL as federal law. The third debate concerns whether the
ATS or some related statutory enactment authorizes federal courts to apply CIL as federal
law consistent with the usual requirements of post-Erie common law creation. The final
debate concerns the scope of the CIL that can be applied in ATS litigation and, relatedly,
how this CIL is to be identified. As we will explain, Erie is central to each of these
debates.
A.

CIL’s Pre-Erie Status

It is uncontroversial that, during the period prior to Erie, federal courts often
applied CIL (which they referred to as part of the “law of nations”) without requiring
authorization from the federal political branches. Before Sosa, courts and scholars
disagreed about whether the CIL so applied had the status of genuinely federal law, or
whether it rather had the status of non-federal general common law. Proponents of the
modern position argued that CIL was federal law and thus escaped Erie’s abolition of
general common law. Revisionists claimed that CIL was general common law that fell
squarely within Erie’s scope.
The debate turned in part on the meaning of certain historic statements concerning
the domestic status of CIL. In the famous Paquete Habana decision, the Supreme Court
stated that CIL “is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
46

Alvarez-Machain also sued the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
See 542 U.S. at 697. While the Ninth Circuit held that the government was liable for false arrest, the
Supreme Court concluded that the government was immune from suit and ordered dismissal of AlvarezMachain’s FTCA claim. See id. at 698-99.
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it are duly presented for their determination.”47 Similarly, the Supreme Court stated in an
earlier decision that it was “bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the
land.”48 And some of the constitutional Founders, speaking later as judges, maintained
that the law of nations was part of “the law of the United States.”49
Citing these and similar statements, some courts and scholars argued that CIL
historically had the status of federal law in the U.S. legal system.50 Harold Koh claimed,
for example, that CIL’s status as federal law has been accepted since “the beginning of
the Republic,” and reflects “a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts’
function.”51 Supporters of this view interpreted phrases like “law of the land,” “law of
the United States,” and “our law” as references to federal law that preempts state law and
creates a basis for federal question jurisdiction. In addition, they claimed that viewing
CIL as non-federal law, and thus as not judicially enforceable against the states, would
have been inconsistent with the Founders’ well-documented desire to ensure that states
complied with international law. The Second Circuit in Filartiga (the first decision to
approve of the use of the ATS for international human rights litigation) similarly asserted
that CIL “has always been part of the federal common law.”52
By contrast, other courts and scholars, and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, concluded that CIL did not have the status of federal law during the preErie period.53 In support of this conclusion, they cited to pre-Erie decisions that
47

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

48

See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); see also 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299-300
(1865) (same); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 567, 570 (1822) (same); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (same); Alexander
Hamilton & James Madison, Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793
at 15 (Richard Loss ed., 1976) (same).
49

See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas.
774, 778 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,760); United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 299 (C.C.D. Pa.
1793); Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Grand Jury charge of Jay,
C.J.); id. at 1117 (Grand Jury charge of Wilson, J.).
50

See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir.
1992); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Jordan J. Paust, International Law as Law of the
United States 6-7 (1996); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53,
57-58 (1981); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 34-46 (1952); Glennon, supra note 10, at 343-47; Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1841, 1846 (1998); Jules Lobel, The Limits
of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071,
1090-95 (1985); Steven M. Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public International
Law, 8 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 289, 289-91 (1982).
51

Koh, supra note 50, at 1841, 1846.

52

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).

53

See Restatement (Third), supra note 1, ch. 2, introductory note, at 41; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 3, at 822-27; Clark, supra note 12, at 1283; Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in
Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 832-33 (1989); Arthur Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1309-11 (1988); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate
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suggested that CIL was not federal law for purposes of Article III or statutory federal
question jurisdiction.54 They also noted that the Executive Branch in the nineteenth
century repeatedly described itself as lacking the authority, in the absence of
congressional authorization, to force the states to comply with CIL.55 Moreover, they
pointed out the most famous general common law decision – Swift v. Tyson – involved
the international law merchant, a component of the “law of nations” of the time. These
scholars contended that phrases like “law of the land,” “law of the United States,” and
“our law” in the nineteenth century were not references to the “Laws of the United
States” in Articles III or VI of the Constitution, but rather were phrases commonly used
to refer to general common law. Finally, this group argued that CIL’s status as general
common law did not conflict with the Founders’ desire to prevent states from violating
CIL, because it merely left the responsibility of policing state compliance with
international law to the federal political branches, which could incorporate CIL into
federal statutory or treaty law, and could vest federal courts with jurisdiction in cases
involving the interpretation of the general common law of CIL.
B.

CIL’s Domestic Status in the Absence of Political Branch Authorization

The second pre-Sosa debate concerned the effect of Erie on CIL’s legal status in
the United States. In particular, the question was whether, after Erie, CIL had the status
of federal common law.
As we briefly explained in the Introduction, modern position proponents
maintained that, after Erie, CIL had the status of self-executing federal common law that
federal courts were bound to apply even in the absence of political branch authorization.56
Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 368 (2002); see also Quincy Wright, The
Control of American Foreign Relations 161 (1922); Charles Pergler, Judicial Interpretation of International
Law in the United States 19 (1928).
54

See, e.g., American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828) (holding that a
case involving application of the “law, admiralty and maritime” – elements of the law of nations – “does
not . . . arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States” within the meaning of Article III); Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (holding that the question whether forcible seizure in a foreign country is
grounds to resist trial in state court is “a question of common law, or of the law of nations" that the
Supreme Court has “no right to review”); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87
(1875) (holding that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review “general laws of war, as recognized
by the law of nations applicable to this case,” because they do not involve “the constitution, laws, treaties,
or executive proclamations, of the United States”). In addition, The Paquete Habana itself strongly
suggested the same conclusion when it stated that CIL as applied by federal courts did not bind either
Congress or the President. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that customs and
usages of civilized nations govern “where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act”); id. at 708 (stating that courts must “give effect to” CIL “in the absence of any treaty or other public
act of [the] government in relation to the matter”).
55
56

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 825 & nn. 56-58.

See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980) (expressing the view that CIL “has an
existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress . . . .”); Henkin, supra note 4, at 1561
(stating that CIL “is ‘self-executing’ and is applied by courts in the United States without any need for it to
be enacted or implemented by Congress”); Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 111(3) (“Courts in the
United States are bound to give effect to [customary] international law . . . .”); id. § 115 cmt. e (“Any rule
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This claim rested in part on the historical proposition, outlined above, that CIL had the
status of federal law since the Founding and thus remained unaffected by Erie’s rejection
of federal general common law. It also relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Sabbatino that the act of state doctrine, which requires courts to treat as valid certain acts
by foreign governments in their own territories, is a rule of federal common law binding
on the states.57 The Court in Sabbatino reasoned that the act of state doctrine should be
subject to a uniform national standard because it was “concerned with a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in
ordering our relationships with other members of the international community.”58
Supporters of the modern position argued that CIL similarly concerns the U.S.
relationship with the international community.59
By contrast to the modern position, the revisionist view was that CIL does not
automatically have the status of federal common law, and that after Erie federal courts
needed some authorization from either the political branches or the Constitution in order
to apply CIL.60 The revisionist view built on the historical contention that CIL was not
federal law prior to Erie. It argued that, after Erie, neither the Constitution nor any
federal statute authorizes the modern position’s envisioned wholesale application of CIL
by the federal judiciary. Articles III and VI of the Constitution both refer to treaties, but
not CIL, in their list of federal laws, and the Constitution’s only reference to CIL is in the
Article I Define and Punish Clause.61 Revisionists argued that this suggests that
Congress must act before CIL is incorporated into domestic law. As for Sabbatino,
revisionists noted that the act of state doctrine, as articulated in Sabbatino, was designed
to prevent judicial involvement in foreign affairs and was grounded in principles of
separation of powers. They then argued that the primary application of the modern
position concerns human rights cases against foreign governments – cases that, contrary
to Sabbatino’s central premise, place federal courts in the center of foreign affairs
controversies. They also noted that the application of a CIL of human rights as federal
common law is contrary to the post-Erie requirement that federal common law conform
to the policies of the federal political branches. Congress has incorporated only select
CIL principles into federal statutory law, and in the human rights context where the
of customary international law ... is federal law (111) [and] supersedes inconsistent State law or policy
whether adopted earlier or later.”); Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 324 (asserting that “whatever [customary]
international law requires, it preempts state law”).
57

See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964). The Court in
Sabbatino said that this conclusion was similar to the position taken by Philip Jessup in an article arguing
that, despite Erie, CIL should not be governed by divergent state interpretations. See id. at 425 (citing
Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L
L. 740 (1939)).
58

376 U.S. at 425.

59

See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 2; Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1057-68 (1967).
60
61

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3; Weisburd, supra note 3; see also Trimble, supra note 3.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “[t]o define and punish . . .
Offences against the Law of Nations”).
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modern position matters most, said revisionists, the political branches have made clear
through their limitations on U.S. ratification of human rights treaties that they do not
want international human rights norms operating as a source of domestic law.
An intermediate position that emerged prior to Sosa was that federal courts could
continue to apply CIL after Erie as non-federal law.62 Under the main variant of this
position, CIL is akin to pre-Erie general common law: Federal and state courts can both
apply it, but state courts do so pursuant to (or by analogy to) state choice-of-law rules,
and are not bound by federal court interpretations of CIL.63 A different intermediate
position rejects this general common law approach and views CIL as federal law, but
federal law of a sort that, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not preempt
state law.64
C.

Did the ATS Authorize Courts to Apply CIL as Federal Law?

The third debate prior to Sosa concerned whether there was, consistent with the
usual requirements for post-Erie federal common law, any congressional statute that
authorized federal courts to apply CIL as federal law. This debate is distinct from,
though potentially related to, the modern position debate. One could reject the view that
CIL is self-executing federal common law and believe nonetheless that Congress has
authorized federal courts to apply CIL as federal law in certain cases.65 The main focus
of this debate was the ATS, the fount of modern international human rights litigation. Is
the ATS a mere jurisdictional statute, or does it also create a cause of action for human
rights abuses, or otherwise authorize courts to apply CIL in cases properly brought under
the ATS? A variety of answers were offered to this question.
One answer was that the ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute that authorized
nothing with regard to substantive law.66 This view rested primarily on the plain
language of the ATS. Enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, a statute that
regulated the jurisdiction and structure of the federal courts, not causes of action, the
62

See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey,
International Law as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 187, 196-97
(2001); Young, supra note 53; Weisburd, supra note 3. It is possible that this is what Philip Jessup had in
mind. See supra.
63

See Weisburd, supra note 3, at 49-55; Young, supra note 62, at 370-75. Professor Aleinikoff
holds a similar view but resists the choice-of-law framework of Weisburd and Young. See Aleinikoff,
supra note 62. Professor Ramsey suggests treating CIL as non-preemptive federal law, and he also resists a
choice-of-law framework. See Ramsey, supra note 62. For additional criticism of approaching this issue
through choice-of-law terms, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and
Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513, 522-27 (2002).
64

See Ramsey, supra note 62.
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See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 872-873 & nn.352-54.
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See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587
(2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 358 (1997).
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original language of the ATS provided that federal district courts “shall also have
cognizance . . . of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”67 “Cognizance” was a term of art referring to
jurisdiction, and the First Congress used different language when it created statutory civil
actions.68 The jurisdictional reading of the ATS found support in the current codification
of the statute, which extends “original jurisdiction” over certain cases brought by aliens
and does not refer to damages or other remedies.
This jurisdictional reading of the ATS was consistent with the decision that
reinvigorated the ATS in modern times, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. Filartiga construed the
ATS, for purposes of its decision, “not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as
opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by
international law.”69 The Second Circuit there held that a human rights suit brought by
Paraguayan plaintiffs against a former Paraguayan official satisfied Article III because
CIL was part of federal common law, and the plaintiffs’ CIL claim therefore arose under
federal law for purposes of Article III.70 The court in Filartiga did not hold, however,
that either CIL itself or the ATS created the plaintiffs’ cause of action. The court insisted
that “the question of federal jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, which requires
consideration of the law of nations” and the “issue of the choice of law to be applied”
were “distinct” issues, and remanded to the district court to determine whether
Paraguayan law or some other law governed the merits of the suit.71
A number of courts after Filartiga, however, including courts in the Second
Circuit, held that the ATS both established federal jurisdiction and also created a
substantive federal cause of action for torts in violation of CIL.72 The most prominent
argument in support of this position was that the 1992 Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), particularly its legislative history, confirmed that Congress had authorized
causes of action in ATS litigation.73 At least one court adopted a somewhat different
position, interpreting the ATS not as creating a cause of action, but rather as authorizing
the federal courts to do so.74 The analogy for this latter position was the Supreme Court’s
67

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 79.

68

See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479 (1986).
69

Filartiga, 630 F.2d 887.

70

Id. at 886-87.

71

Id. at 889.
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See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
73

See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996) (decision denying rehearing)
(“Congress has made clear that its enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act . . . was intended to
codify the cause of action recognized by this Circuit in Filartiga, even as it extends the cause of action to
plaintiffs who are United States citizens”). The TVPA provides a federal cause of action for acts of torture
and “extrajudicial killing” committed under authority of foreign law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note.
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See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
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decision in Lincoln Mills, which implied federal common lawmaking powers from the
Labor Management Relations Act’s grant of federal jurisdiction to decide disputes under
certain labor-management contracts.75
D.

Scope and Sources of CIL in ATS Litigation

The ATS refers to torts in violation of the “law of nations,” but it does not specify
which law of nations rules can be applied, or how to discern their content. Prior to Sosa,
there was disagreement among courts and scholars over the scope and sources of CIL in
ATS litigation. Like the other debates discussed above, this debate over the scope and
sources of CIL occurred against the backdrop of the narrow role for judicial lawmaking
envisioned by Erie.
In terms of scope, the issue was whether plaintiffs could bring claims under all
CIL norms relating to torts or only a subset of such norms. In terms of sources, the issue
was whether, in discerning the content of CIL, courts should focus on verbal evidence of
state positions such as treaties and United Nations General Assembly resolutions or
should instead focus primarily on state practice.
On the scope issue, the court in Filartiga suggested that all CIL rules relating to
torts were eligible for ATS litigation. The court relied on pre-Erie decisions applying
CIL outside of the context of the ATS, such as The Paquete Habana, for guidance on the
proper standard for determining rules of CIL. Based on these decisions, the court stated
that, in order for a norm to qualify as a rule of CIL, it must “command the general assent
of civilized nations.”76 Although the court described this requirement as “stringent,” it
viewed this as a general requirement for CIL, not a requirement unique to the ATS
context. The court also concluded that it should interpret international law not as it was
in 1789 when the ATS was enacted, but “as it has evolved and exists among the nations
of the world today,”77 again suggesting that all rules properly found to be CIL would
qualify.
On the sources issue, the court in Filartiga relied primarily on verbal evidence of
state assent rather than on state practice. In concluding that official torture violated CIL,
the court relied on, for example: references to human rights in the United Nations
Charter; the U.N. General Assembly’s non-binding Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; another non-binding General Assembly resolution concerning torture; various
treaties that the United States had not at that time ratified; and the prohibitions on torture
in a number of national constitutions. The court did not maintain that the international
community had abolished torture in practice. Indeed, the court acknowledged that the
prohibition on torture is “often honored in the breach,” but emphasized that it was not
aware of any nation that verbally asserted that it had the right to engage in torture.78
75

See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
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630 F.2d at 881.
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Id.
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Id. at 884 n.15.
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After Filartiga, some courts suggested that only certain well-defined and widely
accepted CIL norms could be brought in ATS litigation. The Ninth Circuit, for example,
stated that “[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific,
universal, and obligatory.”79 Other courts suggested that the ATS was limited to
particularly egregious violations of CIL. The Second Circuit stated, for example, that the
ATS “applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized
principles of international law.”80 Some litigants and commentators suggested that ATS
litigation be limited to violations of “jus cogens” norms.81 A jus cogens norm is a norm
“accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.”82 In the Ninth Circuit
opinion that the Supreme Court reviewed in Sosa, the court rejected such a jus cogens
limitation, explaining that “[t]he notion of jus cogens norms was not part of the legal
landscape when Congress enacted the ATCA in 1789. . . . Thus, to restrict actionable
violations of international law to only those claims that fall within the categorical
universe known as jus cogens would deviate from both the history and text of the
[ATS].”83
With respect to the sources of CIL, the Second Circuit eventually pulled back
from the approach in Filartiga, which, as noted above, had relied heavily on verbal
statements and “consensus” and had downplayed actual practice. In particular, in Flores
v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the court held that, “[i]n determining whether a
particular rule is a part of customary international law – i.e., whether States universally
abide by, or accede to, that rule out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern –
courts must look to concrete evidence of the customs and practices of States.”84 (In that
case, the court rejected the claim that intra-national pollution violates CIL.) Other courts,
by contrast, continued to rely on United Nations resolutions and other verbal evidence.85
*
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*
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Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Zapata v. Quinn, 707, F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (endorsing this standard). The Second Circuit later clarified
that “Zapata does not establish ‘shockingly egregious’ as an independent standard for determining whether
alleged conduct constitutes a violation of international law.” Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414
F.3d 233, 253 (2d Cir. 2003).
81

See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M.

679.
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Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 614 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (2004).
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See, e.g,, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on, among other
things, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The following table (Table 1) illustrates the four pre-Sosa debates described
above:
Table 1
Conventional Wisdom

Revisionist View

Pre-Erie Status of CIL

federal law

general law

Post-Erie Status of CIL

wholesale incorporation as
federal common law

selective incorporation
based on constitutional or
political branch
authorization

Nature of ATS

either creates federal causes
of action or authorizes
courts to create them

only jurisdictional

Scope and Sources of CIL
to be Applied by U.S.
Courts in ATS Litigation

all of CIL, derived from
wide range of materials

narrow set of CIL norms
tied to actual practice

IV.

Sosa, the ATS, and the Modern Position

In this Part, we analyze Sosa’s implications for the four debates discussed above.
As we demonstrate, Sosa clearly resolved two of the four debates. With respect to the
first debate over the pre-Erie status of CIL, the Court made clear that CIL historically had
the status of general common law, not federal common law. With respect to the third
debate over whether the ATS authorizes the federal courts to create common law causes
of action based on CIL, the Court concluded that although the ATS was originally
intended as only a jurisdictional statute, it nevertheless has the effect today of authorizing
courts to develop a narrow set of federal common law causes of action. In addition to
resolving these debates, the Court in Sosa strongly suggested that with respect to the
fourth debate over the scope and sources of CIL to be applied in ATS litigation, courts
should discern and apply CIL more carefully and cautiously than many lower courts had
done prior to Sosa. Finally, although the Court in Sosa did not specifically address the
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second debate over whether CIL is automatically part of the post-Erie federal common
law, the Court’s reasoning and conclusions are incompatible with the claim that CIL has
this status. We assess Sosa’s implications for this second debate last because these
implications are the most complex and are related to the ways in which Sosa resolved the
other debates.
A.

CIL’s Pre-Erie Status

In Sosa, the Supreme Court dismissed Alvarez-Machain’s CIL claim on the basis
of a complicated chain of reasoning. A critical link in that chain concerned the pre-Erie
status of CIL. While the Court acknowledged that U.S. courts had applied CIL since the
Founding, it made clear that before Erie, the CIL they applied had the status of general
common law, not federal law.
The Court repeatedly described the few law of nations claims that it thought could
have been brought historically under the ATS as part of the pre-Erie “common law.”86
The Court also invoked two famous Holmesian descriptions of general common law in
the context of referring to the pre-Erie domestic status of the law of nations.87 Relatedly,
the Court explained that the law of nations in the nineteenth century encompassed
subjects such as the international “law merchant”88 that were indisputably part of the preErie general common law.89 The Court then stated that “it was the law of nations in this
sense” – the same general common law sense as the law merchant – “that our precursors
spoke about when the Court explained [in the Paquete Habana decision] the status of
coast fishing vessels in wartime grew from ‘ancient usage among civilized nations,
beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law.’”90 And
86

See, e.g., 542 U.S. at 712 (“[A]t the time of enactment the jurisdiction [conferred by the ATS]
enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and
recognized at common law.”); id. at 720 (“[S]ome, but few, torts in violation of the law of nations were
understood to be within the common law.”); id. at 721 (“[T]he ATS was meant to underwrite litigation of a
narrow set of common law actions derived from the law of nations.”); id. at 729 (“[T]he jurisdiction
[conferred by the ATS] was originally understood to be available to enforce a small number of international
norms that a federal court could properly recognize as within the common law enforceable without further
statutory authority.”).
87

Id. at 725 (“[T]he prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 1789 in a way
that counsels restraint in judicially applying internationally generated norms. When § 1350 was enacted,
the accepted conception was of the common law as ‘a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’ Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)”); id. at
721 (noting that argument that the Continental Congress would have no reason to recommend that States
enact statutes to duplicate international law remedies already available at common law “rests on a
misunderstanding of the relationship between common law and positive law in the late 18th century, when
positive law was frequently relied upon to reinforce and give standard expression to the ‘brooding
omnipresence’ of the common law then thought discoverable by reason”) (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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Id. at 715.
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See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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542 U.S. at 715 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900)).
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the Court noted the change in the prevailing conception of the “common law” brought
about in Erie, thus further linking the pre-Erie status of the law of nations with general
common law.91
These passages show that the Court in Sosa understood CIL as having general law
rather than federal law status prior to Erie. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court’s
extensive consideration of what the Court referred to as the “watershed” decision in Erie
and its implications, something that would have been largely unnecessary if CIL were
federal law, rather than general law, prior to Erie. As a result, Sosa eliminates one of the
two central pillars on which the modern position rested — the notion that CIL was
historically federal law and therefore outside Erie’s reach.
B.

Sosa and the ATS

Sosa, and the U.S. government acting as amicus curiae, argued that the ATS was
simply a jurisdictional statute that did not create a cause of action for violations of CIL.
Alvarez-Machain, by contrast, argued that the ATS did create CIL causes of action,
including a cause of action for arbitrary arrest.
The Court unanimously concluded that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action.”92 The Court reasoned that the original ATS provided
that courts would have “cognizance” of certain causes of action, a term that referred to
jurisdiction. It further noted that the ATS was placed in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, “a statute otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction.”93 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas)
agreed with this analysis.94 Thus, as the Court explained, “[a]ll Members of this Court
agree that § 1350 is only jurisdictional.”95
The Court in Sosa believed that its holding that the ATS is only a jurisdictional
statute “raises a new question . . . about the interaction between the ATS at the time of its
enactment and the ambient law of the era.”96 Exploration of this new question led the
Court to conclude that, while the ATS does not itself create causes of action related to
91

542 U.S. at 726. In addition, Justice Scalia’s concurrence explained at length that CIL had the
status of general common law before Erie. Id. at 740-41 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority opinion
disputed several aspects of Justice Scalia’s concurrence, but not this aspect.
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Id. at 724; id. at 712 (“we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional”); id. at 713 (referring
to ATS’s “strictly jurisdictional nature”); id. (“we think the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the
sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject”).
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Id. at 713.
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Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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It is also worth noting that all nine Justices in Sosa referred to 28 U.S.C. §1350 as the “Alien
Tort Statute,” not the “Alien Tort Claims Act,” despite disagreement in the briefs over the proper title for
the statute. The latter title had been favored by those advocating a cause-of-action construction of the ATS.
See Bradley, supra note 66, at 592-93.
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542 U.S. at 714.
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CIL, it does authorize federal courts to recognize post-Erie federal common law causes of
action for a limited number of CIL violations. The Court reached this conclusion in three
steps.
First, the Court reasoned that the Congress that enacted the ATS in 1789 assumed
that there would be pre-existing law to apply, with the status of general common law, in
cases within ATS jurisdiction. As the Court explained, “federal courts could entertain
claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in violation of the law
of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time.”97 The Court
rejected Sosa’s argument (and the Executive Branch’s argument as amicus curiae) that
the 1789 Congress believed that the law of nations component of ATS jurisdiction would
lie fallow unless and until Congress separately enacted statutory causes of action to be
applied in ATS cases.98 Rather, the historical materials persuaded the Court that “the
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law,” and that
Congress thought the practical effect would be guaranteed by pre-existing CIL-related
causes of action available at common law.99
Second, the Court concluded that it should preserve the 1789 Congress’s
background expectation that there would be common law causes of action available to
apply in cases under the ATS. The Court acknowledged that the common law applied in
1789 differed significantly from the common law that federal courts applied after Erie.
But the Court thought “it would be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would
have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international
norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road
to modern realism.”100 In effect, the Court attempted to “translate” the First Congress’s
expectations about the effect of the ATS, which rested on a pre-Erie understanding of
general common law, into contemporary circumstances, including the circumstance that
federal courts could apply common law after Erie only in specialized circumstances.101
In justifying this conclusion, the Court noted that “no development in the two centuries
from the enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of [ATS] cases . . . has
categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations
97

Id.
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Id. at 719 (“[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass the ATS as a
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that
might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element of the law
of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.”); id. (“There is too much in the historical record to
believe that Congress would have enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely”).
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Id. at 724; see also id. (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international
law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”).
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For discussion of a similar idea of translation in the constitutional context, compare Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993), with Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997). See also Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997).
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as an element of common law.”102 In particular, neither Erie nor Congress had
categorically prohibited the judicial recognition of claims under CIL.103
Third, the Court concluded that the best translation of the original ATS in the
post-Erie world is that the ATS authorizes the judicial creation of a domestic remedy, in
the form of a cause of action, for a narrow set of CIL violations.104 Thus, as Justice
Scalia’s concurrence explained (and criticized), the Court inferred, from a jurisdictional
statute that enabled courts to apply CIL as general common law, the authorization for
courts to create causes of action for CIL violations, in narrow circumstances, as a matter
of post-Erie federal common law.105 The Court did not explain how this conclusion was
consistent with its description of the ATS as only jurisdictional, or its view that “[t]he
vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority
to formulate federal common law.”106 But its description of the legitimate bases of postErie federal common law included a citation to Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,107 a decision in which (as noted above) the Court implied federal common
lawmaking powers from the Labor Management Relations Act’s grant of federal
jurisdiction to decide disputes under certain labor-management contracts. Presumably
the common law powers recognized in Sosa were similar.108
C.

Scope and Sources of CIL in ATS Litigation

The Court in Sosa limited its holding that the ATS authorizes federal courts to
recognize federal common law causes of action based on CIL by requiring that any such
recognition must satisfy at least two requirements. First, the CIL norm in question must
be “accepted by the civilized world” to the same degree as the few law of nations norms
that the First Congress would have expected to be enforceable through private claims in
1789.109 Second, the CIL norm in question must also be “defined with a specificity”
comparable to the historic law of nations norms.110 The Court added that the evaluation
of whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support at cause of action “should (and,
indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.”111
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Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981).
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For criticism of the Court’s reasoning on this issue, see Note, An Objection to Sosa – And to the
New Federal Common Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2077 (2006).
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542 U.S. at 725. These norms involved violations of safe conducts, infringement of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy. For discussion of the right of safe conduct, see Thomas H. Lee, The Safe
Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006).
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The Court made clear that this two-part test for domestic enforcement of CIL
under the ATS was more demanding than the test for whether a CIL norm was
internationally binding according to the traditional sources of CIL.112 It made clear, in
other words, that the CIL violations Congress made actionable in ATS cases are a subset
of all CIL violations. Applying this two-part test, the Court concluded that AlvarezMachain did not allege a violation of a norm of CIL so well defined and accepted as to
support the creation of a federal cause of action.113 While this conclusion is easy to state,
the Court’s analysis of the sources and scope of the CIL available in ATS cases raises a
number of questions. In what follows, we explore these questions, and explain why,
despite ambiguities in some places, the opinion is best read as significantly limiting the
causes of action available in ATS cases.
Consider first the Court’s “clear definition” requirement. Many lower courts prior
to Sosa had not required a close correspondence between the content of the sources relied
on by plaintiffs and their causes of action. The Supreme Court in Sosa took a stricter
approach. For example, the Court maintained that the recognition by national
constitutions of a prohibition on arbitrary detention reflected a consensus at too “high [a]
level of generality” to support Alvarez-Machain’s claim for relief for a one-day detention
not authorized by law.114 Similarly, it found insufficient the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations’ claim that a “state policy” of “prolonged arbitrary detention” was a
violation of CIL, in part because the Restatement required “a factual basis beyond
relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority.”115 The Sosa decision thus
seems to limit causes of action in ATS cases to those whose content corresponds closely
with the plaintiffs’ sources.116 This conclusion is consistent with the Court’s insistence,
in another part of the opinion, that it had “no congressional mandate to seek out and
define new and debatable violations of the law of nations.”117
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Id. at 736 (“Alvarez cites little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding
customary norm today. He certainly cites nothing to justify the federal courts in taking his broad rule as the
predicate for a federal lawsuit . . . .”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 737 (“Even the Restatement’s limits [on the
customary international law rule concerning arbitrary detention] are only the beginning of the enquiry,
because although it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those
who enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which policies cross that line
with the certainty afforded by Blackstone's three common law offenses.”); id. at 738 n.29 (“[T]hat a rule as
stated is as far from full realization as the one Alvarez urges is evidence against its status as binding law;
and an even clearer point against the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce the aspiration
behind the rule claimed.”); cf. Meltzer, supra note 63, at 519 (noting that “the fact that a rule has been
recognized as [customary international law], by itself, is not an adequate basis for viewing that rule as part
of federal common law”).
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The meaning of the “acceptance” prong of the Sosa test for recognizing a cause of
action in ATS cases is less certain. As noted above, many pre-Sosa lower court decisions
had downplayed the traditional state practice requirement for CIL and had emphasized
instead state acceptance as reflected in instruments like General Assembly resolutions,
multilateral treaties, national constitutions, and official pronouncements of international
bodies.118 Sosa appeared to render some of these sources irrelevant, minimized the
significance of others, and reemphasized the importance of looking to state practice in
ATS cases.
The Court in Sosa first looked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a
U.N. General Assembly Resolution outlining fundamental human rights norms that preSosa courts had relied on heavily in identifying causes of action in ATS cases.119 The
Court declined to rely on this source as a basis for a CIL cause of action, noting correctly
the “Declaration does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international
law,” and concluding that the Declaration did not itself “establish the relevant and
applicable rule of international law.”120 Although the Court went on to acknowledge that
the Declaration had had a “substantial indirect effect on international law,” it also noted
that the Declaration had “little utility under the standard set out in this opinion,” and the
Court did not consider the Declaration further in its analysis of whether AlvarezMachain’s proposed norm of arbitrary detention had become so well accepted to warrant
a cause of action in ATS cases.121
The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Like the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR was
widely relied upon in pre-Sosa ATS cases for the identification of CIL causes of action.
The Court in Sosa noted that the ICCPR, unlike the Universal Declaration, did bind the
United States as a matter of international law, since it is a treaty and has been ratified by
the United States. But the Court added that the ICCPR was “not self-executing and so
did not in itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”122 For this reason,
the Court concluded that the ICCPR, like the Universal Declaration, had “little utility”
under the Sosa standard for identifying CIL causes of action.123 Although the Court did
mention the ICCPR in its subsequent analysis of CIL, it did so only in a negative way.
After describing Alvarez-Machain’s claim that the CIL prohibition on “arbitrary
detention” extended to any brief detention not sanctioned by domestic law, the Court
added that “whether or not this is an accurate reading of the [ICCPR], Alvarez cites little
authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding customary norm today.”124 The
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clear implication here is that, contrary to lower court practice prior to Sosa,125 the
presence of a norm in the ICCPR does not provide significant evidence of a CIL cause of
action in ATS cases.126
The Court in Sosa also considered national constitutions that showed that “many
nations recognize a norm against arbitrary detention.”127 This too was a source that lower
courts had considered prior to Sosa.128 In contrast to the Universal Declaration and the
ICCPR, the Court implied that this source might be influential in establishing that nations
had accepted the norm in question.129 But as explained above, the Court dismissed this
source in this case because the consensus against arbitrary detention reflected in the
constitutions was at a significantly higher level of generality than Alvarez-Machain’s
claim.130
Yet another source that the Court considered was the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations. Once again, lower courts had relied heavily and uncritically on the
Restatement in developing federal common law causes of action under the ATS. Many
courts viewed the Restatement’s list of customary international human rights norms to be
actionable under the ATS.131 The Court in Sosa rejected this approach. It said that
whether a norm was included in the Restatement list was “only the beginning of the
enquiry, because although it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary
detentions are so bad that those who enforce them become the enemies of the human
race, it may be harder to say which policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by
Blackstone’s three common law offenses.”132 This passage implies that even if a CIL
norm is included in the Restatement list, the norm might not be sufficiently well defined
to support a cause of action under the ATS.
Another way in which the Court limited the sources that had been relied on in preSosa cases concerned the extent of the allowable gap between actual state practice and
the proposed CIL cause of action. The Second Circuit in Filartiga had reasoned that
“[t]he fact that the prohibition of torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish
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its binding effect as a norm of international law.”133 While acknowledging that
“violations of a rule [do not] logically foreclose the existence of that rule as international
law,” the Court in Sosa observed “that a rule as stated is as far from full realization as the
one Alvarez urges is evidence against its status as binding law; and an even clearer point
against the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce the aspiration behind
the rule claimed.”134 Contrary state practice by itself will not disprove the existence of a
rule of CIL or a private cause of action to enforce the rule under Sosa, but a large gap
between actual state practice and the proposed rule or cause of action is relevant to
whether courts should recognize such a rule or cause of action.
In sum, the Court in Sosa departed in many respects from the prevailing lower
courts’ approach to recognizing CIL causes of actions in ATS cases. Its “definition”
requirement demands a tight connection between the plaintiff’s allegations and the
sources in support of a CIL cause of action. And its “acceptance” requirement
contemplates a narrow conception of relevant sources of law. More specifically, as
compared to pre-Sosa practice, the Court in Sosa rejected as irrelevant the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it narrowed the relevance of national constitutions, the
Restatement, and particularly the ICCPR, and it reduced the allowable gap between a CIL
norm’s aspiration and the actual practice of states. It is no surprise, in this light, that the
Court in Sosa envisioned that, under its approach, only a modest number of claims would
be recognized under the ATS.135
It remains unclear, however, precisely how far Sosa went in this regard. The lack
of clarity results from the Court’s favorable citation to prior lower court opinions that had
embraced the very methods and sources of CIL identification that the Court in Sosa
appeared to discount. Thus, for example, the Court stated that its definition and
acceptance limitations were “generally consistent” with the reasoning in Filartiga even
though Filartiga relied on sources – General Assembly Resolutions, unratified or nonself-executing treaties, and a survey of national constitutions – that the Court in Sosa
itself discounted or deemed irrelevant.136 The Court also cited Filartiga for the
proposition that its position on recognizing CIL causes of action “has been assumed by
some federal courts for 24 years.”137 But Filartiga did not view the ATS as authorizing
the development of federal common law causes of action. Instead, Filartiga assumed for
the purposes of its analysis that the ATS was a purely jurisdictional statute and was
constitutional for suits between aliens because CIL was federal common law; it did not
consider the cause of action question, and indeed remanded on the issue of governing
law.138 The Court’s citations to Filartiga are all the more puzzling because the Court
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disapprovingly referred to other cases that had relied on the same sources for the
identification of CIL as those relied on in Filartiga.139 This leaves two possible
explanations for the Filartiga references. The Court may have cited Filartiga and related
decisions simply for the proposition that some CIL could be domesticated in ATS cases, a
point on which Filartiga and Sosa clearly agree. Or it may have cited Filartiga and
related decisions not because it agreed with their use of sources, but because it agreed
with their ultimate conclusions about particular rules of CIL. Regardless of what one
makes of these citations, ultimately they must bear less weight than the Court’s own
treatment of controversial sources of CIL, which, as discussed above, was significantly
restrained.
D.

Sosa and the Modern Position

We now turn to the issue concerning which we believe the commentators on Sosa
have fallen into greatest error: the implications of Sosa for the modern position view that
all of CIL, “whatever it requires,” is automatically incorporated wholesale into the postErie federal common law.140 Recall that the modern position rests on two principal
arguments: first, the historical claim that CIL was part of federal law rather than general
law prior to Erie; and second, the doctrinal claim that CIL was incorporated wholesale
into federal common law after Erie. We have already explained how Sosa expressly
rejected the modern position’s historical claim. In this Section we explain why the
Court’s reasoning in Sosa cannot be reconciled with the modern position claim about
CIL’s post-Erie status, and is best viewed as having implicitly rejected it.
In a nutshell, our argument is that the opinion in Sosa is preoccupied with the
limitations that Erie imposes on the federal courts’ common lawmaking powers,
limitations that cannot be reconciled with the modern position. In particular, the Court’s
insistence in Sosa that any federal common law relating to CIL must conform to and not
exceed the contours of what the political branches have authorized, its recognition that
the ATS authorizes courts to enforce only a very small subset of CIL, and its limited view
of judicial power vis-a-vis the federal political branches and even the states in cases
involving CIL, simply cannot be reconciled with the modern position view that all of CIL
is automatically part of judge-made federal common law even in the absence of political
branch authorization. After making these points, we consider counterarguments.
1.

Inconsistencies Between Sosa and the Modern Position

The Court in Sosa embraced a conventional understanding of the nature of postErie federal common law. It noted that Erie significantly narrowed the common law
powers of federal courts to “havens of specialty,” or “interstitial areas of particular
federal interest.”141 Although the Court acknowledged that Sabbatino had recognized a
139
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“competence to make judicial rules of decision of particular importance to foreign
relations, such as the act of state doctrine,” the Court explained that even in the foreign
relations context “the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before
exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”142
The Court in Sosa further suggested that these limitations on post-Erie federal
common law had the following implications for judicial incorporation of CIL – three
concerning separation of powers, and one concerning federalism. First, and most
fundamentally, in deciding whether the federal courts could incorporate CIL even though
the ATS was merely a jurisdictional statute, all nine Justices engaged in a search for
positive authority for the incorporation. That is, the Court unanimously turned, not to a
discussion of powers inherent in the federal courts or of the broad common law status of
CIL, but to Congress’s intent in enacting the ATS. Indeed, the entire thrust of the Sosa
opinion was an attempt to ground its holding about the incorporation of CIL in what
Congress intended and authorized.143 The historical section of the opinion was consumed
by a search for the original understanding of what Congress authorized,144 and the Court
built on this historical understanding to ascertain what the ATS itself authorized in
modern times. So for example, the Court rejected the claim that the 1789 statute “should
be taken as authority to recognize the right of action asserted by Alvarez here,” and it
stated, as a reason for judicial caution in creating new causes of action under the ATS,
that “[w]e have no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations.”145
Second, and related to the authorization requirement, the Court made clear that
the development of a domestic federal common law of CIL must proceed interstitially
and conform to the wishes of the political branches. The Court twice invoked the nonself-execution declaration attached to the ICCPR as a reason not to rely on the ICCPR in
developing domestic federal common law related to CIL.146 It also noted that the
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“affirmative authority” in the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) “is confined to
specific subject matter” and would not support “judicial creativity” beyond its terms.147
And it tethered modern recognition of CIL-based claims to the historical paradigms
Congress anticipated in enacting the ATS.
Third, the Court emphasized that the separation of powers limitations on the
common law powers of federal courts were especially forceful in foreign relations cases.
As the Court noted, “the potential implications for the foreign relations of the United
States of recognizing [federal common law causes of actions in ATS cases] should make
courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs.”148
Fourth, the Court explained that Erie’s federalism concerns were relevant even to
a federal common law of CIL. In disputing Justice Scalia’s contention that the Court’s
analysis would mean that the federal question jurisdiction statute, like the ATS, would
carry “with it an opportunity to develop common law,” the Court noted that “our holding
today [about the ATS] is consistent with the division of responsibilities between federal
and state courts after Erie as a more expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 might not be.”149 Even with regard to CIL, the Court made plain, the federalism
justification for a narrow reading of the common law powers of federal courts remains.
This approach to judicial incorporation of CIL is fatal to the modern position view
that all of CIL is federal common law. As an initial matter, the application of all of CIL
as federal common law is inconsistent with the requirement that federal common law be
interstitial. There is also no authorization whatsoever for the application of all of CIL as
federal common law. A wholesale incorporation of the federal common law of human
rights in particular would defy the wishes of the political branches, which have
consistently ratified human rights treaties on the condition that they not apply as domestic
law. The wholesale judicial incorporation of CIL into domestic federal law is also at
odds with the proposition that federal courts must act cautiously in this area. And finally,
to the extent that the federal common law of CIL in the human rights context would
address traditional domestic concerns like the domestic regulation of the death penalty,150
it would be in tension with Erie’s federalism principles.
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Not only is the modern position inconsistent with the post-Erie approach
articulated in Sosa, it is inconsistent with what the Court in Sosa stated that it was
allowing. Sosa involved a situation, according to the Court, where the political branches
had authorized the incorporation of CIL (through the ATS). But even here, the Court
made clear that it was authorized to incorporate only a small portion of CIL. In response
to Justice Scalia’s claim that Erie abrogated the domestic incorporation of CIL, the Court
insisted only that “the door to further independent judicial recognition of actionable
international norms” was not shut altogether, but rather was “still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”151 The
Court repeatedly made the point that it was not embracing the wholesale incorporation of
CIL. Instead, it was simply defending the possibility that federal courts, consistent with
what Congress has authorized, need not “avert their gaze entirely from any international
norm intended to protect individuals,” and that Erie did not cause courts to lose “all
capacity to recognize enforceable international norms,” and that nothing Congress had
done “shut the door to the law of nations entirely.”152 These passages assume that Erie
significantly narrowed, but did not eliminate, the circumstances in which CIL could be
applied domestically consistent with a political branch authorization. They are difficult
to square with the modern position claim that all of CIL applies as federal common law in
the absence of political branch authorization.
Finally, the Court’s disclaimer concerning the federal question jurisdiction statute
further supports the view that it rejected the modern position. The Court disputed Justice
Scalia’s claim that under the majority’s approach every grant of jurisdiction – most
notably, the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 – would carry with it the
opportunity to develop federal common law related to CIL.153 But if CIL were
automatically part of federal law, it is difficult to see why cases arising under that law
would not fall within the jurisdiction provided for in the federal question statute, given
that the Supreme Court has held that federal common law qualifies as part of the “Laws
of the United States” for purposes of that statute.154 Moreover, the Court denied that its
reasoning would mean that law of nations claims could be created under other
jurisdictional grants by observing that the ATS, unlike other jurisdictional statutes, “was
enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by
entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations.”155
In sum, the Court’s reasoning in Sosa is inconsistent with the modern position
claim that all of CIL is automatically federal law in the form of federal common law.
The Court stated that Erie significantly narrowed the circumstances in which CIL could
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apply as domestic law, and, consistent with the nature of the post-Erie federal common
law, it grounded its recognition of a limited incorporation of CIL in the specific
intentions of the framers of the ATS. Sosa’s careful, cautious, and narrow incorporation
of CIL in a discrete jurisdictional context where there is specific evidence that the
drafters expected CIL to apply cannot be reconciled with the modern position view that
all of CIL is domestic federal law regardless of whether Congress or the President
authorized its incorporation.
In addition to ruling out the modern position, Sosa also appears to rule out the
“intermediate approach” that has been suggested by some scholars in the modern position
debate, whereby U.S. courts would apply CIL law as general common law, as they did
before Erie.156 As we have already explained, the Court reiterated Erie’s assertion that
federal courts could no longer apply general common law.157 In addition, the Court’s
narrow allowance of an incorporation of CIL in discrete circumstances authorized by the
political branches differs substantially from the automatic unauthorized incorporation of
CIL that took place under the general common law regime.158 And, in referring to the
causes of action that would be allowed under the ATS, it referred specifically to “federal
common law,” not general common law.159 Finally, and most specifically, the Court
observed that “we now adhere to a conception of limited judicial power first expressed in
reorienting diversity jurisdiction [in Erie], that federal courts have no authority to derive
‘general’ common law.”160
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Id. at 729. It would be theoretically consistent with Sosa for federal courts to apply CIL even
in the absence of a federal authorization if there were a pertinent state law authorization. Such an
authorization would not likely flow, as some have suggested, see, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 3, at 52-55,
from state choice-of-law rules, which in general look to foreign law rather than international law. An
authorization might conceivably flow from state receiving statutes, which incorporate into state rules of
decision at least part of the common law of England, and which might thereby include CIL. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 870 n. 345; Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International
Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 280 (1931). It is doubtful,
however, that such receiving statutes authorize the incorporation of modern CIL, see Bradley and
Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 870 n. 345, and no state court that we are aware of has construed a receiving
statute in such a fashion. The important point for present purposes is that any CIL applied by a federal
court pursuant to a state receiving statute would not be general common law, but rather would be properly
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2.

Counterarguments

Commentators who have concluded that Sosa embraces the modern position tend
to ignore the points discussed above and rely instead on two other aspects of the Sosa
decision. We consider these aspects below and conclude that they do not contradict our
conclusions.
First, commentators have emphasized the Court’s statement that, “For two
centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law
of nations.”161 As explained above, the Court in Sosa understood that CIL did not have
the status of federal law before Erie, so this historical statement cannot be a claim about
CIL’s status as federal common law. Indeed, it is telling that the Court merely states here
that U.S. domestic law “recognizes” CIL, and does not claim that CIL is automatically
incorporated into U.S. law, let alone into U.S. federal law. Instead of endorsing the
modern position, the Court is claiming here only that U.S. law can take account of CIL,
which is clearly correct independent of the modern position. There were many instances
prior to Erie in which federal courts incorporated or took account of CIL, and, as we
explain in Part V, there are many post-Erie examples in which federal courts, consistent
with this statement, borrow from, or “recognize,” CIL in select instances, something far
short of the wholesale incorporation of CIL into U.S. federal law posited by the modern
position.
Second, commentators have emphasized the Court’s references to Sabbatino.162
In a parenthetical, the Court quoted the following dictum from Sabbatino: “[I]t is, of
course, true that United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in
appropriate circumstances.”163 The Court also observed in a footnote that Sabbatino
endorsed the reasoning in a short essay published by Professor Jessup in 1939 that argued
that the Erie doctrine should not be applied to CIL.164 Whatever their precise import,
these references are not an endorsement of a wholesale federalization of CIL. The
quotation from Sabbatino refers to the application of CIL “in appropriate circumstances,”
and the Jessup essay merely argues that CIL should not be treated under Erie as state law,
not that it should be treated as post-Erie federal common law (the conception of which
was still in its infancy in 1939). Moreover, as the Court notes in Sosa, the Sabbatino
decision did not even involve the application of CIL.165 Rather, Sabbatino involved the
characterized as state law. It therefore would not support the “general common law” intermediate position
outlined in the text.
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application of the act of state doctrine, which the Court in Sabbatino made clear was
based on domestic separation of powers considerations and was not required by
international law.166 While the receiver in Sabbatino raised a CIL argument (concerning
a prohibition on the expropriation of alien property), the Court declined to consider that
argument, and indeed declined to apply CIL at all. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Court in Sosa relies on the language in Sabbatino only for the modest proposition that
federal courts need not “avert their gaze entirely” from CIL norms protecting
individuals.167
The Court’s other references to Sabbatino, which have not been emphasized by
modern position proponents, further confirm that the Court did not view Sabbatino as
support for the modern position. These citations occurred in the course of explaining
why courts should exercise restraint in considering new causes of action based on CIL.168
One of these two citations approved Sabbatino’s use of the act of state doctrine to prevent
foreign relations problems that would have resulted from applying CIL as a rule of
decision.169 The Court in Sosa believed that similar restraint was required in ATS suits
which involve attempts by aliens to enforce international law against their own
governments and thus “raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.”170 This
reliance on Sabbatino as a restraint on the consideration of international claims
contradicts the argument that the Court viewed Sabbatino as supporting the unrestrained
incorporation of CIL into federal common law.
The other reference to Sabbatino occurs in a discussion of Erie’s transformation
of the role of federal courts and of the nature of federal common law.171 In that context,
the Court notes that, “although [it has] even assumed competence to make judicial rules
of decision of particular importance to foreign relations,” as occurred in Sabbatino, “the
general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law.”172 And then the Court immediately states, with reference
to the incorporation of CIL in ATS cases, that it would “be remarkable to take a more
aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of
the prior two centuries.”173 This understanding of the import of Sabbatino simply cannot
support the wholesale incorporation of CIL as federal common law.
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The following table (Table 2) illustrates how Sosa resolved the four debates
discussed in Part II:
Table 2
Conventional
Wisdom

Revisionist View

Sosa

Pre-Erie Status of
CIL

federal law

general law

general law

Post-Erie Status of
CIL

wholesale
incorporation as
federal common law

selective
incorporation based
on constitutional or
political branch
authorization

selective
incorporation based
on constitutional or
political branch
authorization

either creates
federal causes of
action or authorizes
courts to create
them

only jurisdictional

only jurisdictional,
but nevertheless has
the effect today of
authorizing courts to
create some federal
causes of action

all of CIL, derived
from wide range of
materials

narrow set of CIL
norms tied to actual
practice

narrow set of CIL
norms tied to actual
practice

Nature of ATS

Scope and Sources
of CIL to be
Applied by U.S.
Courts

V.

A Post-Sosa Approach to CIL as Federal Common Law

We argued in Part IV that Sosa rejected the modern position view that CIL is
incorporated wholesale into domestic federal common law. It does not follow, however,
that CIL is irrelevant to federal common law outside the context of the ATS. The
essential problem with the modern position is that it ignores the significance of Erie and
the requirements and limitations of the post-Erie federal common law. As Sosa made
clear, however, CIL can be incorporated into, or inform, federal common law consistent
with the requirements of Erie. In this Part, our goal is to sketch a general account of the
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federal common law of CIL that is more faithful to the premises of post-Erie federal
common law than the overbroad modern position.
We begin by considering possible jurisdictional bases for applying CIL as federal
common law. We next consider a variety of non-jurisdictional contexts in which it may
be proper for courts to formulate federal common law rules relating to CIL, either as gapfilling relating to statutes or treaties, or as grounded in certain structural constitutional
considerations. We conclude by considering several areas of likely debate during the
next decade concerning the domestic application of CIL.
A.

Possible Jurisdictional Bases for CIL as Federal Common Law

The Supreme Court has made clear that, as a general matter, “[t]he vesting of
jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to
formulate federal common law.”174 There are exceptions to this rule. In Lincoln Mills,
the Court (controversially) interpreted a statute conferring federal jurisdiction over suits
involving violations of labor contracts to authorize federal courts to develop substantive
federal common law “fashion[ed] from the policy of our national labor laws.”175 And, in
Sosa itself, the Court interpreted congressional expectations relating to a jurisdictional
statute, the ATS, as authorizing courts to develop limited federal common law causes of
action related to CIL. Nonetheless, consistent with the general rule, the Court in Sosa
made clear that its interpretation of the ATS did not “imply that every grant of
jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop common law.”176
We now explain why two other jurisdictional provisions – the federal question statute and
the diversity statute – do not confer federal common lawmaking power, and we
distinguish them from two jurisdictional clauses in Article III – for interstate disputes and
admiralty disputes – that have been construed as conferring such authority.
1.

Federal Question

The most prominently invoked jurisdictional statute other than the ATS as a basis
for federal common law related to CIL is the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
which provides district courts with “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”177 Prior to Sosa, commentators
and litigants had argued that cases arising under CIL arose under the “laws of the United
States” for purposes of Section 1331. Notice that the argument here is different than
under the ATS. Sosa addressed whether the ATS authorized federal courts to develop
federal common law causes of action under CIL. The argument under the federal
question jurisdiction statute, by contrast, is that CIL is part of the “laws of the United
174
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States” within the meaning of that statute. If this latter claim is true, then CIL not only
gives rise to federal jurisdiction, but is itself also part of federal law with potential
implications under the Constitution’s Take Care and Supremacy Clauses.
Prior to Sosa, most lower courts that had addressed the question had concluded
that CIL was not part of the laws of the United States for purposes of the federal question
jurisdiction statute, and thus could not be a basis for federal jurisdiction under that
statute.178 The Court in Sosa itself stated that, in contrast with the ATS, there was “no
reason to think that” Congress intended the federal question jurisdiction statute to
authorize courts to apply CIL as federal common law.179 The Court added that the
incorporation of CIL as federal common law under the federal question jurisdiction
statute might not be consistent with “the division of responsibilities between federal and
state courts after Erie.”180 For two reasons, such skepticism about CIL and the federal
question statute is warranted.
First, an analysis similar to the one that the Court in Sosa performed on the ATS,
as applied to Section 1331 and the “ambient law of the era” at the time that it was written,
shows that the framers of Section 1331 did not view CIL as part of the “laws of the
United States.” Section 1331 was enacted in 1875 without substantial debate.181 It was
designed to provide a statutory basis for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction
provided for in Article III.182 But in the nineteenth century when it was enacted, Article
III’s reference to judicial power over cases arising under the laws of the United States
was not viewed as including the law of nations.183 This conclusion is consistent with the
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proposition, confirmed in Sosa, that CIL in the pre-Erie period was viewed as general
common law, not federal law.
Relatedly, in the same year as the enactment of the 1875 Act, the Supreme Court
held that the phrase “laws of the United States” in the statute regulating appellate
jurisdiction over state law did not include the law of nations.184 The Court reasoned that
it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review “general laws of war, as recognized by the law
of nations applicable to this case” because they do not involve “the constitution, laws,
treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States.”185 Many other decisions in the
years after the 1875 statute and before Erie reached similar conclusions.186 The same
well-understood and uncontroversial reasons why the law of nations was not part of the
“laws of the United States” for statutory appellate jurisdiction – namely, the law of
nations’ status as non-federal general common law – would have applied to the original
federal question jurisdiction statute.
As a result, unlike the ATS, Section 1331 was not enacted on the understanding
that federal courts would be able to hear CIL-based claims pursuant to Section 1331’s
jurisdictional grant. Nor is there any indication that Congress intended to confer
authority to incorporate CIL as federal common law through the general federal question
statute. As with the ATS, probative legislative history surrounding conferral of general
federal question jurisdiction is sparse. General federal question jurisdiction was not
conferred with any permanence until 1875, and then subject to a $500 amount in
controversy requirement.187 Nothing in the legislative history of the 1875 conferral of
general federal question jurisdiction suggests that Congress had CIL on its mind in any
way. Indeed, recorded legislative debate on the relevant bills did not focus on the
conferral of general federal question jurisdiction at all.188
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Congress’s imposition of an amount in controversy requirement in the federal
question statute further suggests that Congress did not intend to authorize the
incorporation of CIL, as there is no reason to believe that claims based on CIL violations
would typically exceed the required amount and qualify for federal adjudication. Nor
have subsequent amendments to the federal question statute suggested any intent to
incorporate CIL as federal common law. After 1875, Congress periodically increased the
amount in controversy required to establish general federal question jurisdiction in order
to relieve the workload of the federal courts by denying jurisdiction for monetarily
insubstantial claims.189 Along the way, Congress exempted many types of federal
statutory claims from this requirement, but did not eliminate the requirement for claims
arising under federal common law until 1980 when the amount in controversy
requirement was dropped from the general federal question grant entirely.190 At that
point, the House Judiciary Committee noted that federal common law claims were among
a relatively small number of claims to which the jurisdictional amount still applied and
reasoned that the 1980 elimination of the monetary requirement would therefore not
significantly affect the federal judiciary’s workload.191 Retention of the jurisdictional
amount requirement for common law until the eventual repeal of the requirement
altogether does not suggest an endorsement of federal judicial incorporation of CIL. Nor
is there anything in the committee analysis behind the abandonment of the amount in
controversy requirement suggesting any focus on CIL.
Second, as we have already seen, one reason why the Court in Sosa resisted the
idea that the “laws of the United States” in Section 1331 included authority to develop
CIL as federal common law was that the assertion of such broad federal common law
powers might not be “consistent with the division of responsibilities between federal and
state courts after Erie.”192 It is one thing for federal courts to recognize a limited set of
causes of actions in suits brought by a narrow class of plaintiffs based on a statute that
references the law of nations, as the Court did in Sosa. But when federal courts
incorporate CIL wholesale into domestic law – including those aspects of CIL that
increasingly regulate functions formerly regulated by states – they move from the
molecular to the molar, from the retail to the wholesale, in a way inconsistent with the
limited common lawmaking powers of federal courts.
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In sum, if one performs the same type of analysis under the federal question
jurisdiction statute that the Court in Sosa performed with respect to the ATS, one reaches
the opposite conclusion: the framers of the federal question jurisdiction statute did not
intend the statute to be an authorization for the application of CIL.
2.

Diversity

The ATS analysis in Sosa also raises a question about whether CIL can be applied
as federal common law in diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court in Sosa
tried to recapture in the post-Erie world the relationship between the ATS and the
“ambient law of the era” at the time the ATS was written in 1789. The diversity statute
was originally enacted at the same time as the ATS. Moreover, the framers of the
diversity statute clearly contemplated that courts sitting in diversity would apply the law
of nations in some cases, at least in the sense in which the law of nations included the law
merchant and other aspects of the general law related to commercial transactions. (This
was, after all, what Swift v. Tyson was all about.) If Sosa’s analysis of translating the preErie general common law that the ATS framers thought would apply in ATS cases into
post-Erie federal common law applied to the diversity statute as well, then one might
argue that the diversity statute should constitute authorization for the application of
modern CIL as genuinely federal common law in cases that have the diversity of
citizenship and amount in controversy required under the statute.
For many reasons, we do not believe that this conclusion follows. The main
reason is Erie itself, which Sosa relied on and affirmed, and which in overruling Swift
clearly held that diversity jurisdiction was not a basis for the application of general
common law, and could not be a basis for applying federal common law in the absence of
some congressional authorization.193 Thousands of post-Erie cases have applied what
was formerly general common law as state law, not federal law.
Second, unlike with the ATS, there is no evidence that the framers of the diversity
statute intended to authorize creation of a federal common law based on the public law
of nations. Congress based diversity jurisdiction on the identity of the parties, not also on
violations of the law of nations as in the ATS.194 Consistent with that fact, the evolution
of diversity jurisdiction repeatedly reveals that diversity jurisdiction was intended to sidestep the perception and existence of local bias in state administered justice, not to
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See, e.g., Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73 (citing scholarship for proposition that Congress enacted the
Rules of Decision Act in 1789 “merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some
federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written”); see also Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 728 (“[W]e now adhere to a conception of limited judicial power first expressed in reorienting federal
diversity jurisdiction, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that federal courts have no authority
to derive ‘general’ common law.”).
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483 (1928).

See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
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accommodate a certain type of substantive law.195 Moreover, the grant was crafted with
an amount in controversy threshold to limit the authority of federal courts and (as an
original matter) to protect citizens against the threat of distant litigation and protect the
interests of U.S. debtors who could more easily avoid their debts to British creditors in
state courts.196 Congress thus intended to shield a class of party-based claims from
federal review rather than grant broad federal authority to hear claims arising from any
substantive body of law. Similarly, Congress directed federal courts to apply state law as
the rule of decision “except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide,” suggesting that Congress did not anticipate
that the federal courts sitting in diversity would develop or apply a body of federal
common law.197
3.

Interstate and Admiralty Disputes

In contrast to the federal question and diversity contexts, the Supreme Court has
recognized that it is appropriate to exercise federal common lawmaking powers related to
CIL in two other jurisdictional contexts in addition to the ATS. The same day that Erie
was decided, the Supreme Court drew on principles of CIL to resolve a boundary dispute
between Colorado and New Mexico, and made clear that its rule of decision drawn from
CIL had the status of federal common law.198 Similarly, the Court has made clear that
when it develops common law in its admiralty jurisdiction, that law has the status of
federal common law.199
In our view, the use of CIL in these jurisdictional contexts, whether or not
ultimately appropriate, is easier to justify under traditional principles of federal common
law than the use of CIL in the diversity and federal question contexts. Consider interstate
disputes first. The best argument for the development of federal common law as a rule of
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See id. at 492-98, 501, 510; Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of
Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869, 876 & n.13 (1931); John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the
Federal Judicial System, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 22-28 (1948); Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage
Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 554-64 (1989). Cf. Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 312 (1999) (noting, but disputing, the standard explanation that the diversity and
admiralty jurisdictional grants lead to very different common lawmaking authority because “the Framers
intended the [admiralty] grant . . . to facilitate the development of a uniform law of maritime commerce,
while they intended the Diversity Clause to provide an unbiased forum for out-of-state litigants”).
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See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1430-58, 1479-88, 1493-1500, 1515-1516, 1518.
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Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34 (1789).
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See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106-107, 110
(1938); HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 738-39.
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See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953); see also See G. Edward
White, A Customary International Law of Torts 44-45 (draft), available at
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art34 (arguing that admiralty law was non-preemptive
federal law pre-Erie); Young, Preemption, supra note 196, at 326, 347-38 (noting, and criticizing, that the
Supreme Court has attempted “to ‘translate’ the Framers’ conception of maritime law into . . . [the postErie] context” by transforming maritime law from general law into federal common law).
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decision in these cases is that the uniquely federal interests derived from the structure of
the Constitution demand a federal rule.200 These cases are expressly contemplated by
Article III, they fall within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction,201 they cannot
practically be decided by the states or under state law given that the states themselves are
parties,202 they are relatively rare,203 and they involve the resolution of disputes that are
directly analogous to disputes between nations. Moreover, both in the First Judiciary Act
and today, jurisdiction over interstate disputes is vested exclusively in the Supreme
Court.204
Even with these limiting factors, the Supreme Court is cautious in stepping into
interstate disputes, where the creation of common law may be required.205 When the
Court does craft common law to govern interstate disputes, the Court takes into account
not only constitutional,206 but congressional guidance relevant to the dispute.207 Indeed,
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See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1975) (“The
authority to create federal common law springs of necessity from the structure of the Constitution, from its
basic division of authority between the national government and the states.”); Texas v. New Jersey, 379
U.S. 674, 677 (1965).
201

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Clark, supra note 12, at 1324-25 (recognizing, but disputing, the
conventional notion that federal common lawmaking authority in interstate disputes derives from Article
III’s jurisdictional grant).
202

See Texas Industries, 541 U.S. at 641 (noting that, in interstate disputes, “our federal system
does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law, . . . because the interstate or international
nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control.”); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure of Article III, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1607-08 (1990) (citing Hamilton’s
understanding that federal jurisdiction over suits involving states is grounded in the principle that no man
should judge his own case).
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See HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 279-80.
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Act of Sep. 24, 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 80; 28 U.S.C. §1251(a).

205

See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906) (“Before this Court ought to intervene [in
interstate disputes], the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to
be applied should be one which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain against all considerations on
the other side”); id. at 517-21; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) (citing and applying the
high standard of Missouri v. Illinois); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931) (citing
Missouri v. Illinois and New York v. New Jersey in explaining that “[t]he governing rule is that this Court
will not exert its extraordinary power to control the conduct of one State at the suit of another unless the
threatened invasion of rights is of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing evidence”);
Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93-94, 108 (denying Illinois’ motion to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction while
noting that “[i]t has long been [the Supreme] Court’s philosophy that ‘[its] original jurisdiction should be
invoked sparingly’” and that the exclusive grant of interstate dispute jurisdiction is read as “obligatory only
in appropriate cases,” though stating that the Court’s restrictions on its original jurisdiction stem, at least in
part, from a desire to ease the Court’s docket); HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181,
at 301-03 (noting Supreme Court’s exercise of discretion to refuse to hear even cases within the Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction); see also Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 580 (1922) (adjudicating conflicting
claims by Oklahoma, Texas, and the United States that had led to efforts to mobilize both states’ militias).
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See Connecticut, 282 U.S. at 670 (In suits regarding the competing water rights of states,
“principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the ‘equal level or plane on which all the
States stand, in point of power and right, under our constitutional system.’”); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (respecting the constitutional sovereignty and equality of states in developing the
doctrine of equitable apportionment); Clark, supra note 12, at 1322 (noting that many of the rules
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when the Court decides issues arising from interstate compacts approved by Congress,
the Court in effect interprets a congressional act, a task well within the traditional scope
of federal common lawmaking.208 Moreover, to the extent the Court looks to CIL in
creating common law in these cases, it does not directly incorporate CIL into U.S.
domestic law, but rather draws on the narrow component of CIL that governs, for
example, international boundary or water disputes to inform the federal common law that
governs resolution of interstate boundary disputes.209 In this sense, the federal common
law developed in interstate cases is doubly narrow: the occasions in which the Court
develops federal common law are rare, and CIL informs domestic federal law in a limited
fashion.
There is an additional factor that distinguishes the interstate jurisdiction context
from the federal question and diversity contexts. For over 200 years, courts have not
perceived a structural need to apply CIL as federal common law in the diversity and
federal question jurisdiction contexts. By contrast, even before Erie the interstate
jurisdiction clause was understood to authorize federal courts to make federal law in the
absence of any legislative guidance, subject to subsequent congressional revision.210
Claims of structural necessity as a basis for federal common law are more plausible if
these claims have a long historical pedigree.
developed in interstate disputes “appear to implement the constitutional equality of the states”); id. at 132325, 1328-31.
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See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313-15, 317-23 (noting that Congress may by subsequent
legislation displace federal common law regarding interstate disputes and holding that Congress had done
just that in enacting the comprehensive Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972); id. at
316-17 (explaining that the standard for finding congressional preemption of federal common law is lower
than for finding congressional preemption of state law); Illinois, 406 U.S. at 101-04 & n. 5 (Congress had
neither prescribed nor prohibited the remedy Illinois sought, but the statutes Congress had enacted, while
“not necessarily [defining] . . . the outer bounds of the federal common law,” might “provide useful
guidelines in fashioning such a rule of decision.”); Missouri, 200 U.S. at 518-19 (citing Pennsylvania, 54
U.S., in which the Court relied on related but not controlling congressional acts and a congressionally
approved interstate compact to resolve an interstate nuisance dispute); HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL
COURTS, supra note 181, at 740 (noting the Court’s use of congressional guidance in interstate water
pollution disputes, one of few areas of interstate dispute where congressional guidance is available).
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HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 739; see Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 565-66 (1851) (noting that an interstate compact approved
by Congress becomes a law enforceable by the Supreme Court).
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See Meltzer, supra note 63, at 540; HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181,
at 287 (“The Court draws on federal, state and international law, as appropriate, in fashioning the[]
common law rules” that govern interstate disputes); Clark, supra note 12, at 1328-30 (In implementing the
constitutional equality of the states through its interstate dispute common law, the Court in some cases may
“borrow international law doctrines [which do not apply to interstate disputes “of their own force” but
which were] . . . originally developed to implement the ‘absolute equality’ of sovereign nations.”); New
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378-85 (1934) (applying the international law doctrine of the Thalweg to
resolve a boundary dispute between New Jersey and Delaware); Connecticut, 282 U.S. at 670 (“For the
decision of suits between States, federal, state and international law are considered and applied by this
Court as the exigencies of the particular case may require.”).
210

See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 97 (1907).
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The same basic analysis applies to admiralty jurisdiction. Admiralty is, of course,
a traditional component of the law of nations that was important to the prosperity of the
infant United States.211 Even the weak national government during the period of
Confederation exercised some authority over admiralty disputes.212 When it came time to
craft the new Union, opposition to a broad federal judiciary was strong.213 The proposed
grant of federal diversity jurisdiction, for example, was bitterly opposed.214 By contrast,
even those who opposed the federal judicial system contemplated by the Constitution and
established by the Judiciary Act agreed on the need for “national admiralty courts.”215
“When proposals to abolish Congress’s Article III authority to establish federal courts
were made in state ratifying conventions and in the First Congress, there was usually an
exception for courts of admiralty.”216 As a result, and in notable contrast with the
treatment of the law of nations more generally, the Constitution explicitly extended
federal judicial authority to include admiralty.217
Finally, Congress has enacted various statutes to govern private admiralty issues.
As a result, much of federal admiralty law today is found in statutes or treaties and not
exclusively in the common law.218 CIL is often used for interstitial gap-filling, an
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HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 15; see David P. Currie,
Federalism and Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 158 SUP. CT. REV. 158, 163-64 (1960); Frank, supra
note 196, at 14.
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See HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 6 & nn.32-33 (describing the
Continental Congress’s authority “to ‘appoint’ state courts for the trial of ‘piracies and felonies on the high
seas’” and Congress’s establishment of a national tribunal to hear appeals in capture cases); Frank, supra
note 196, at 6-9 (describing admiralty courts during the colonial and Confederation periods).
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See HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 6-9.
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See id. at 17, 19; Holt, supra note 196, at 1468-71, 1477; Charles Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 56 (1923). Cf. Frank, supra note 196,
at 3 & n.1. Opposition to diversity jurisdiction survived the founding and continues to this day. See, e.g.,
S. Rep. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (recommending passage of a bill to eliminate federal
jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different U.S. states).
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WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 187, at 6; see also; Friendly, Diversity, supra note 194, at
484 n.6; Holt, supra note 196, at 1428-30 & n.26; Frank, supra note 196, at 9; Michael G. Collins, The
Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1520-21, 152330, 1539-40, 1555, 1565, 1570-71 (2005). Cf. Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 196, at 277-80 &
nn.41-42, 314-17, 348 (noting a consensus in favor of federal admiralty jurisdiction, though disputing the
suggestion that the Framers intended to federalize all substantive admiralty law).
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WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 187, at 6; see Warren, supra note 214, at 119, 120
(describing such a proposal in the First Congress); cf. id. at 123 & n. 166 (noting a similar attempt to amend
what became the First Judiciary Act to limit lower federal courts to courts of admiralty).
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See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

See Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 469, 477 & n.31 (2004); HART AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 181, at 735; Robert
Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367, 1370-77, 1382-84
(1999); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization
of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 374 & n.32, 405-06 (2000); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19, 27 (1990). Cf. Gutoff, supra, at 403-06, 417 (finding congressional delegation of authority to create a

46
uncontroversial use of federal common law that is a far cry from the wholesale
incorporation of CIL contemplated by those who advocate the use of the federal question
statute or the diversity statute as a basis for treating CIL as federal common law.219 Even
on issues where Congress has not specifically legislated, the Supreme Court has tried to
conform the common law of admiralty to Congress’s intent behind related statutes.220 In
short, admiralty is only one small subset of CIL and, as with interstate disputes, is a
subset that is used in a narrow fashion that is often consistent with the traditional
approach to federal common law.
B.

Possible Substantive Bases for CIL as Federal Common Law

We now turn from an examination of possible jurisdictional authorizations to
possible substantive authorizations – in statutes, treaties, Executive branch
pronouncements, and the Constitution – for a federal common law of CIL. As we will
see, there continues to be a robust role for CIL in the U.S. legal system even if one rejects
the modern position.
1.

Statutes

Some statutes specifically reference CIL and thus invite courts to incorporate and
interpret CIL as part of the statutory scheme. An oft-cited example is the federal piracy
statute, which provides that, “[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United

federal common law of admiralty in Congress’ reenactment and expansion of admiralty jurisdiction in
1948).
219
220

See Young, supra note 196, at 477.

See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 530 (bolstering conclusion that New York’s Workmen’s Compensation
Act did not apply to a maritime accident by noting that the Workmen’s Compensation remedy would be
inconsistent “with the policy of Congress to encourage investments in ships” as manifested in two acts
“which declare a limitation upon the liability of [ship] owners”); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375, 390-402 (1970) (noting that legislative “policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of
. . . the statutes involved” and should “be given its appropriate weight . . . in [matters] of decisional law”
and relying on the policies behind related, but not controlling, federal statutes to recognize a wrongful
death remedy in general maritime law); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811,
820, 821 (2001) (majority and concurrence quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455
(1994), for the proposition that federal common lawmaking in admiralty should “harmonize with the
enactments of Congress in the field”); American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 456-57 (following the Jones Act’s
lead in finding that state forum non conveniens rules may apply to general maritime claims); Miles, 498
U.S. at 27 (“In this era [in which Congress has legislated extensively on admiralty matters], an admiralty
court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance.”); id. at 32-37 (limiting
recovery under general maritime law to coincide with limited recovery sanctioned by Congress in related
statutes). Cf. Norfolk Shipbuilding, 532 U.S. at 820 (majority) (Given “Congress’s extensive involvement
in legislating causes of action for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that
assert new claims beyond what those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave further development to
Congress.”); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 n.40 (1981) (“[E]ven in
admiralty we decline to fashion new remedies if there is a possibility that they may interfere with a
legislative program.”).
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States, shall be imprisoned for life.”221 This statute clearly authorizes courts to ascertain
and apply as federal law the CIL prohibition on piracy.222 In this situation, it makes sense
to talk about a federal law status for CIL. Similarly, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) provides an exception to foreign governmental immunity for certain
situations in which “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue.”223 The phrase “international law” in this exception refers primarily to the CIL
governing the expropriation of alien property. When courts apply a CIL standard under
this jurisdiction, they are best understood as doing so under a federal common law
rationale.224
Sometimes courts will develop federal common law not pursuant to an express
reference in a statute but rather in order to fill in gaps in the statutory scheme. Thus, for
example, some courts have looked to CIL in interpreting aspects of the FSIA even where
CIL is not expressly incorporated, based on indications in the FSIA’s legislative history
that this is what Congress intended.225 Another example comes from the Supreme
Court’s decision in First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba.226 In that case, the issue was what standard should apply in determining whether
to pierce the veil between a foreign government and its state-owned corporation for
purposes of attributing the government’s actions to the corporation (and thereby allowing
for a counterclaim of expropriation to be brought against the corporation). The FSIA,
which provided the basis for subject matter jurisdiction and the potential abrogation of
sovereign immunity, did not address this issue. In resolving the question, the Supreme
Court developed federal common law based on what it described as “principles . . .
common to both international law and federal common law, which in these circumstances
is necessarily informed both by international law principles and by articulated
congressional policies.”227 As noted above, this sort of statutory gap-filling, guided by
congressional intent, is probably the most common (and uncontroversial) type of federal
common law.
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18 U.S.C. § 1651.
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See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610
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28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).

(1818).
224

See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is
appropriate to look to international law when determining whether [an action] constitutes a ‘taking’ for
purposes of FSIA.”); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d
Cir.1981) (“The [FSIA’s] drafters seem to have intended rather generally to bring American sovereign
immunity practice into line with that of other nations.”). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note (defining “extrajudicial
killing” in Torture Victim Protection Act as not including a killing “that, under international law, is
lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation”) (emphasis added); 109 P.L. 54; 119 Stat. 499,
Section 201 (2005) (requiring EPA to regulate the use of human subjects in pesticide testing “consistent
with . . . the principles of the Nuremberg Code with respect to human experimentation”).
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See, e.g., Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1294-96 (11th Cir.
1999); cf. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir.1992)
(“Congress intended the FSIA to be consistent with international law.”).
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462 U.S. 611 (1983).
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Id. at 623.
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The Charming Betsy canon of construction is another way in which courts may
look to CIL in the statutory context. Pursuant to this canon, courts will construe
ambiguous federal statutes to avoid conflicts with international law.228 CIL is not applied
as a rule of decision under this canon, but rather as a relevant consideration in discerning
Congress’s intent. This canon almost certainly has the status of federal common law
because a state court interpreting a federal statute would be bound to follow it. Indeed,
the obligation of state courts to construe a federal statute in the same way that federal
courts would construe it (including by reference to the Charming Betsy canon where
relevant) can be seen as the flip side of Erie.229
2.

Treaties

When U.S. courts apply treaties, they sometimes look to CIL principles to resolve
ambiguities and fill in gaps. In doing so, they often rely on the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which sets forth a variety of general rules governing the formation,
interpretation, and termination of treaties.230 The United States has not ratified the
Convention and thus it cannot bind the United States as a treaty. The U.S. government
has stated, however, that at least many of the Convention’s terms reflect CIL.231 Perhaps
not surprisingly, therefore, many courts often invoke the CIL of treaty law as embodied
in the Vienna Convention.232 Most often, they apply the principles of interpretation in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention to construe treaties that the United States has
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See, e.g., F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32
(1982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See also Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 114 (“Where fairly possible, a
United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international
agreement of the United States.”).
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See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEORGETOWN L.J. 479, 534 n. 305 (1998).
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See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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See Restatement (Third), supra note 1, at 145 & n.2 (1987) (documenting Executive Branch
statements); S. Exec. Doc. L, at I (1971) (noting that the Vienna Convention “is already generally
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”).
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The Second Circuit recently explained why (and how) it believed it could apply CIL based on
the Vienna Convention even though the United States had not ratified the Convention:
Although we have previously recognized the Vienna Convention as a source of
customary international law, it bears underscoring that the United States has never
ratified the Convention. Accordingly, the Vienna Convention is not a primary source of
customary international law, but rather one of the secondary sources summarizing
international law, that we rely upon only insofar as they rest on factual and accurate
descriptions of the past practices of states.
Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 80 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2005).
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ratified.233 Sometimes, courts look to principles of CIL as embodied in the Vienna
Convention to ascertain whether a treaty exists.234 It is unclear whether the authorization
for courts to apply the CIL of treaty law in these contexts is best thought of as coming
from the ratified treaty in question, or from the Executive Branch.235 But in any event, as
in the statutory authorization cases, these gap-filling and interpretive uses of CIL are
similar to the federal common law that has been applied in the domestic realm, and these
uses are closely tied to the actions and policies of the political branches.
3.

Executive Branch Authorization

In some circumstances, the Executive Branch can provide the authorization for
courts to draw upon CIL in developing federal common law. A particularly good
example is the way in which courts have addressed head-of-state immunity. For most of
our nation’s history, head-of-state immunity was viewed as a component of foreign
sovereign immunity. Prior to Erie, and consistent with the view that CIL was treated as
non-federal general common law, federal and state courts alike applied the CIL of foreign
sovereign immunity on the domestic plane without authorization from Congress or the
Executive.236 Around the time of Erie, the Supreme Court stopped applying the CIL of
immunity on its own authority, as it had done under the general common law regime, and
began to justify its application on the basis of Executive Branch authorization.237 The
Supreme Court never expressly tied its shift in treatment of foreign sovereign immunity
doctrines to Erie. But the shift took place at approximately the same time as Erie, and it
is easy to understand why Erie was pivotal, since Erie required all applications of law to
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be grounded in a constitutional or political branch authorization, and there was no other
plausible source of authorization.238
In 1976, the FSIA transferred the political branch authorization for judicial
application of foreign sovereign immunity from executive suggestion to congressional
statute. The FSIA did not specify whether its immunities extend to heads of state, either
current or former.239 This silence raised the question of whether a foreign head of state is
entitled to immunity in U.S. courts after the FSIA, and if so, on what basis. Although
courts have varied in their answers to this question, they have always grounded the
application of head-of-state immunity in an authorization from the Constitution or the
political branches.240 Some courts view the FSIA as providing for head-of-state
immunity, even though the text of the statute is silent on the issue.241 Most courts,
however, view the FSIA as inapplicable to a head of state and instead look to Executive
Branch authorization to apply the doctrine.242 Among the courts that seek Executive
Branch authorization, some recognize head-of-state immunity only in the face of an
explicit suggestion of immunity by the Executive.243 Others rely on the lack of an
Executive Branch suggestion simply as a factor weighing against immunity.244 In all of
these cases the courts are looking to political branch authorization.
C.

CIL as Federal Common Law: Future Debates

In this Section, we examine three contexts in which CIL’s status as domestic law
is likely to be most debated during the next decade. The first involves corporate liability
238

This posture was especially appropriate because, at the time of Erie, the CIL of immunity was
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During the nineteenth century, the United States, like many other countries, adhered to the “absolute”
theory of sovereign immunity, under which foreign governments were entitled to immunity for essentially
all of their acts, even those that were purely commercial in nature. In the early twentieth century, however,
a number of countries began embracing the “restrictive” theory, under which foreign governments were
entitled to immunity for their public or sovereign acts, but not for their private or commercial acts. This
shift to the restrictive theory, formally endorsed by the U.S. State Department in 1952, made the CIL of
immunity much more complex and difficult to apply. It also meant that foreign sovereigns would be hailed
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for alleged human rights violations; the second involves the war on terrorism; and the
third involves the Supreme Court’s use of foreign and international materials to inform
constitutional interpretation.
1.

Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability

Some courts prior to Sosa had suggested that corporations could be held liable
under the ATS for aiding and abetting human rights abuses committed by foreign
governments.245 If this proposition were legally correct, it would substantially increase
the number and scope of potential ATS cases as compared with the first wave of ATS
cases brought against state officials. Among other things, it would increase the number
of ATS defendants subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States; corporations
typically have more assets than individual defendants and thus are likely to be a more
attractive target for plaintiffs and their lawyers; and corporations, unlike foreign
governments, are not protected by sovereign immunity. For a variety of reasons, we
believe that the best reading of Sosa is that ATS liability cannot be extended to
corporations based on an aiding and abetting theory absent further action by Congress.
Most international law – both treaty-based and customary – imposes obligations
only on States.246 This is true even of much of human rights law. The Torture
Convention, for example, addresses only torture committed by “a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.”247 There are a few norms of international law, such
as prohibitions on genocide and war crimes, that apply to individuals, at least for the
purpose of criminal prosecution.248 If such norms were also applicable to corporations (a
questionable proposition),249 a corporation could be subject to liability under the ATS for
245
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directly violating one of these norms, assuming the other requirements in Sosa are
satisfied.250 Even if a direct liability claim were appropriate, Sosa suggests that it may be
necessary for courts to apply limiting doctrines designed to promote international comity,
such as the act of state doctrine and a requirement of exhaustion of local remedies.251
Corporations, however, do not typically commit, or even conspire to commit,
genocide or war crimes. As a result, most of the ATS claims brought against
corporations have alleged that they were indirectly liable for human rights abuses
committed by foreign government actors as a result of their acts of aiding and abetting,
such as providing the perpetrators with financial support or materials. There is already a
division in the courts over whether such a common law claim is consistent with Sosa.252
We agree with the courts that have found that it is not.
As an initial matter, it is important to recall that the text of the ATS refers to torts
“committed” in violation of international law. There is no suggestion in this language of
third-party liability for those who facilitate the commission of such torts. By contrast,
just a year after the enactment of the ATS, Congress enacted a criminal statute containing
specific provisions for indirect liability – for example, for aiding or assisting piracy.253
The analysis in Sosa suggests a number of reasons why aiding and abetting
liability should not be read into the ATS. The Court repeatedly emphasized that,
consistent with the limited nature of the ATS and the separation of powers constraints on
the federal courts, only a “modest number” of claims could be brought under the ATS
without further congressional authorization.254 The Court further counseled the lower
courts to exercise “great caution” in recognizing new claims.255 And the Court
250
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emphasized that “innovative” interpretations should be left to Congress.256 As noted
above, however, allowing corporate aiding and abetting liability would significantly
expand ATS litigation. It would also require courts to exercise significant policy
judgment normally reserved to the legislature – for example, in fashioning the precise
standards for what constitutes aiding and abetting.
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court declined to imply aiding and abetting
liability in civil cases brought under the securities fraud statute. In Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,257 the Court reasoned that allowing for aiding
and abetting liability for securities fraud would expand the litigation in a way that would
implicate policy tradeoffs best resolved by Congress.258 The Court also reasoned that
Congress’s authorization of aiding and abetting liability in the criminal context did not
suggest a general acceptance of that type of liability in the civil context.259 Finally, the
Court noted the substantial uncertainties associated with the standard for aiding and
abetting.260
Nor does a claim for corporate aiding and abetting appear to meet the requirement
in Sosa that norms, to be actionable under the ATS, must have at least the same “definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations [as] . . . the historical paradigms familiar
when [the ATS] was enacted.”261 There is little evidence that civil liability for corporate
aiding and abetting is widely accepted around the world. While the concept of aiding and
abetting liability is recognized as a general matter in international criminal tribunals, that
concept is applied in those tribunals only to individuals, not to corporations. Moreover,
even with respect to individuals in these cases, the standards for aiding and abetting
liability vary. For example, while the ICTY tribunal requires an aider or abettor to have
mere knowledge that his acts assist in a crime, the ICC Statute is more demanding,
requiring that the aider or abettor act with the purpose of facilitating the commission of
the crime.262
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A comparison between the claim rejected in Sosa and the argument for imposing
aiding and abetting liability on corporations is revealing. The Court in Sosa rejected an
arbitrary detention claim under the ATS even though a norm prohibiting States from
arbitrarily detaining individuals was expressly included in the ICCPR, numerous other
treaties, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, and 119 national constitutions.263
The gap between international aspiration and enforceable ATS claims that was too large
in Sosa is significantly larger with respect to corporate aiding and abetting liability for
human rights abuses. There is no relevant treaty that embraces aiding and abetting
liability for corporations, the Restatement says nothing about such liability, and there is
no widespread state practice of imposing liability on corporations for violations of
international human rights law. To paraphrase Sosa, that a rule of corporate liability is so
far from full realization is evidence against its status as binding law, and even stronger
evidence against the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce the
aspiration behind the rule.264
The “practical considerations” adverted to by the Court in Sosa also weigh against
judicial recognition of corporate aiding and abetting liability. These suits entail
assessments of foreign government conduct that is otherwise immune from U.S.
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. They also pose a risk of
interfering with political branch management of U.S. relations with the relevant countries
– for example, in choosing whether to promote or restrict investment in these
countries.265 And this litigation is also likely to be perceived as improperly
extraterritorial, especially when directed at foreign companies.266 Invoking these policy
concerns, the Executive Branch has expressly opposed corporate aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS.267 Consistent with Sosa (and Erie), assessment of such policy
issues is best left to the political branches.
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Finally, the Court in Sosa made two specific references to corporate ATS
litigation, and neither reference was supportive of aiding and abetting liability. The
Court stated in a footnote that, in considering whether a norm is sufficiently definite to
support a cause of action under the ATS, a “related consideration” is “whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.”268 Although cryptic, this statement suggests that it may be proper to limit
ATS claims against private actors to situations in which the defendant itself violates the
international law norm in question, which would preclude corporate aiding and abetting
liability. The Court also referred at length in another footnote to a pending ATS case
brought against corporations that had done business with South Africa during the
apartheid regime and said that there was a “strong argument” that courts should defer to
the Executive Branch’s view that this litigation would interfere with U.S. foreign
relations.269 These statements, along with the more general points discussed above,
suggest that corporate aiding and abetting liability is improper under the ATS after Sosa.
2.

The War on Terrorism

In the wake of the September 11 attacks and the ensuing “war on terrorism,”
many of the alleged enemy combatants in U.S. custody have, in various ways, invoked
CIL as federal law that, in their view, limits the Executive’s discretion to conduct the
war. Detainees at Guantanamo have argued, for example, that even if they are not
directly covered by the Geneva Conventions, the standards reflected in Common Article
3 of the Conventions are binding on the United States as a matter of CIL, and that these
standards preclude trial by military commission.270 They have also argued that their
ongoing detention violates CIL prohibitions on arbitrary and prolonged detention that
bind the President as part of U.S. federal common law,271 or have sought remedies for
interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement that allegedly violate CIL
norms.272 Individuals allegedly subject to detention or rendition elsewhere have likewise
asserted violations of CIL norms against prolonged arbitrary detention, and torture and
other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.273
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It is highly unlikely that such claims can be brought against the government in an
ATS suit after Sosa. As an initial matter, the U.S. government is presumptively immune
from suit in U.S. courts. The Federal Tort Claims Act partially waives sovereign
immunity, but it has an exception for claims “arising in a foreign country”274 – an
exception that the Court in Sosa, in a part of the opinion not discussed in detail above,
construed favorably to the government.275 This and related immunity doctrines impose a
significant obstacle to ATS suits against the U.S. government and its officials.276 Even if
the immunity obstacle could be overcome, any ATS claim against the government would
need to satisfy the requirements imposed by Sosa, including the requirement that the CIL
norms in question be widely accepted and specifically defined. The Court in Sosa also
made clear that, in deciding whether to allow a CIL claim, courts should be “particularly
wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
managing foreign affairs.”277 This separation of powers consideration is especially strong
with respect to claims directed at the Executive Branch’s management of a war.
War on terror claims brought outside the ATS raise additional issues. One
fundamental issue is whether courts can apply CIL to override presidential action in the
absence of some affirmative authorization in a treaty or statute. Whether CIL binds the
President as a matter of domestic law has been the subject of significant academic
debate.278 In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court stated that it was appropriate to
apply CIL “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision.”279 In light of this statement, most lower courts have held that CIL
cannot be applied to override the “controlling executive acts” of the President and other
high-level Executive officials.280 Although Sosa did not address the precise issue, its
implicit rejection of the modern position, described above, would seem to preclude
binding the President to CIL as a matter of domestic law in the absence of an
274
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incorporating statute or treaty. If CIL is not automatically domestic federal law, then it is
hard to see how it is part of the “Laws” that the President must faithfully execute under
Article II.
Another likely obstacle for war on terror claims brought outside the ATS is lack
of congressional authorization. Even in the context of a claim against a private foreign
citizen, the Court in Sosa searched for congressional authorization for the application of
CIL. It is difficult to find any congressional authorization, however, for the judicial
application of CIL to regulate the war on terror. For example, following September 11,
Congress passed an “Authorization to Use Military Force” (AUMF) that broadly
authorized the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against al Qaeda and
related entities, but did not refer to CIL in its authorization, let alone domestic court
application of CIL.281 While the customary laws of war may inform the powers that
Congress has implicitly conferred on the President in the AUMF, there is no suggestion
that Congress intended to impose affirmative CIL constraints on the President, much less
judicially enforceable CIL constraints.282
The need for courts to find congressional authorization to apply international law
to the war on terrorism is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.283 In Hamdan, the Court held that the military commissions that President
Bush had established after the September 11 attacks were not properly constituted
because, among other things, they failed to comply with requirements in Common Article
3 of the Third Geneva Convention.284 Importantly, however, the Court repeatedly
emphasized that it was applying these requirements because they had been incorporated
into U.S. law by Congress. The Court assumed for the sake of argument that Common
Article 3 could not be invoked “as an independent source of law,”285 but reasoned that it
was nevertheless part of the international “laws of war,” and that Congress in Section 821
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice had required the President to comply with the
281
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laws of war in establishing military commissions.286 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
further emphasized this congressional incorporation of Common Article 3.287 This
insistence on congressional authorization for domestic court application of a treaty
provision that has already been expressly ratified by the political branches suggests, a
fortiori, that there is such a requirement for domestic court application of the unwritten
norms of CIL.
None of the points made thus far imply that the United States lacks an
international obligation to comply with norms of CIL relevant to the war on terrorism or
that the political branches should not take account of those obligations in regulating the
war. Even when CIL is not enforceable by U.S. courts, it still binds the United States on
the international plane. This point was obscured in a draft Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum concerning the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the war on
terrorism, in which the authors asserted that “any customary law of armed conflict in no
way binds, as a legal matter, the President or the U.S. Armed Forces concerning the
detention or trial of members of al Qaeda and the Taliban.”288 This assertion is true, at
most, only with respect to domestic law, not international law. The final version of the
memorandum properly refined this assertion.289
3.

International and Foreign Sources in Constitutional
Interpretation

In recent years, the Supreme Court has cited and relied on in various ways
international and foreign materials in the course of interpreting provisions of the U.S.
Constitution.290 This practice has generated significant controversy, both in the academy
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and among policymakers.291 There has been little discussion, however, of the
relationship between this practice and the practice of applying CIL as domestic law.292
We begin with the relationship between an internationalized constitutionalism and
the modern position. The two practices bear certain similarities. Both modern position
advocates and those advocating an internationalized constitutionalism invoke the same
basic sources – treaties (sometimes non-self-executing or unratified ones), foreign laws
and decisions, U.N. resolutions, the writings of jurists, and the like – in an effort to
persuade U.S. courts to grant relief in domestic courts not otherwise available under U.S.
law. Moreover, both the modern position and internationalized U.S. constitutionalism are
complementary strategies for achieving domestic legal change. A good example of this is
the juvenile death penalty. For years litigants argued, largely unsuccessfully, that an
alleged CIL prohibition on the execution of juvenile offenders was binding domestic CIL
that preempted state juvenile death penalty laws.293 These litigants were eventually more
successful, however, in using nearly identical sources to convince the Supreme Court that
the Eight Amendment, interpreted in light of these sources, prohibited the execution of
juvenile offenders.294
Despite these similarities, there are significant differences between the modern
position and the use of international and foreign materials in constitutional interpretation.
From one perspective, the use of international and foreign materials in constitutional
interpretation raises more significant normative concerns than the modern position. It is
generally understood that Congress can overrule any judicial domestication of CIL, a
point emphasized in Sosa.295 Constitutional interpretations, however, bind Congress and
can be overturned only through a constitutional amendment. Whatever one thinks of this
latter practice, the use of international and foreign materials in constitutional
interpretation raises two levels of potential anti-majoritarian concern – unelected federal
judges incorporate these materials into U.S. law, and they do so in a way that
permanently displaces the political branches from their usual role in this regard.
291

For articles supporting this practice, see, for example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International
Constitution, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium,
119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); and Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (2004). For articles critical of this practice, see, for example, Ernest
A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005); Roger P. Alford,
Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004); Robert J.
Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291 (2005); and John O.
McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2006). For examples of policy
controversy, see Cleveland, supra, at 4 & nn. 14-19.
292

A partial exception is Waldron, supra note 291, who discusses Sosa and Roper together, but
does not analyze their relationship.
293

For examples, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52
DUKE L.J. 485 (2002).
294

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

295

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 753.

60

Whatever their similarities, an internationalized constitutionalism does not entail
or even support the modern position view that all of CIL is domestic federal law. Courts
have drawn on foreign and international sources in interpreting the Constitution
throughout U.S. history, including during the first 150 years of the nation when CIL
clearly did not have the status of domestic federal common law.296 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions drawing on foreign and international sources
have treated these sources, at most, as factors that may be relevant to the interpretation of
vague or uncertain constitutional provisions, not as sources of law that have direct and
binding application in the U.S. legal system.297 The Court has emphasized, for example,
that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”298 By contrast,
under the modern position, CIL is not merely an interpretive tool but is binding of its own
force in U.S. courts in a way that is not tethered to any extant federal law.
When we compare the trend towards internationalized constitutionalism with the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Sosa, further puzzles appear. The Supreme Court has been
much less rigorous with respect to foreign and international materials in its constitutional
interpretation cases than it was with respect to these sources in the context of the ATS in
Sosa. In Roper v. Simmons, for example, in which the Court held that the execution of
juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, the Court cited,
among other things, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a treaty that had not been
ratified by the United States, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which the U.S. had ratified with a reservation declining to agree to the ban in
that treaty on the juvenile death penalty.299 By contrast, in Sosa, as discussed above, the
Court described the ICCPR as having “little utility” in its analysis, even though, unlike in
Roper, there was no relevant reservation there with respect to the issue before the
Court.300
It is difficult to know what to make of the Supreme Court’s differing treatment of
foreign and international sources in the constitutional and ATS contexts. The application
of foreign law in both contexts might be viewed as consistent with Erie’s positivism
because in both contexts the Court relies on a domestic sovereign source that purportedly
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makes relevant the foreign and international materials, and the resulting legal conclusions
reflect domestic U.S. law.301 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has a more developed
theory of the relevance of foreign and international law sources in the ATS context than
in the constitutional context – a theory that, consistent with Erie, severely limits judicial
discretion in relying on foreign and international sources. If the Court begins to place
more significant weight on these materials in its constitutional decisions, it will need to
pay greater attention to the limitations of these materials, just as it did in Sosa.

VI.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa resolves a number of the debates
concerning the domestic status of CIL. The Court confirmed that CIL historically had the
status of non-federal general law. The Court also made clear that any evaluation of CIL’s
modern status must operate against the background of Erie and the limitations of the
post-Erie federal common law. Most importantly, the Court’s reasoning and conclusions
are incompatible with the modern position claim that CIL is automatically part of U.S.
federal law. CIL is part of U.S. domestic law, under the analysis in Sosa, only when its
incorporation into domestic law has been authorized by either the structure of the
Constitution or the political branches, and it is applied interstitially in a manner consistent
with the relevant policies of the political branches. Nevertheless, because there are a
number of plausible structural and statutory authorizations for the domestication of CIL
in select areas, this body of international law will continue to play an important role in
U.S. judicial decisionmaking, and therefore will continue to be, in the words of The
Paquete Habana, “part of our law.”
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